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Abstract 
Essays on Corruption and Corporate Finance 
Taek-yul (Ted) Kim 
 
 
 
The essays in my dissertation investigate how political corruption affects business 
decisions made by firms. 
In the first essay (co-authored with Jacqueline Garner and Adam Yore), we study 
how do firms respond when operating within a corrupt environment. To answer this 
question, we analyzes the interaction between the degree of local political corruption, 
lobbying expenditures, corporate investment, the cost of capital, and firm value. Using a 
sample of almost  11,000 firm year observations over a 12 year time period, we provide 
evidence that firms operating in corrupt political environments spend greater dollars on 
lobbying which helps secure safer cash flows.  Consistent with a securing safer returns 
argument, these lobbying-intensive firms have less volatile cash flows and stock returns. 
They also exhibit lower costs of equity and an overall lower weighted average cost of 
capital.  However, these benefits come at a cost: lobbying firms are associated with a 
reduction in spending on traditional investment such as research and development and 
capital expenditures. Overall, our evidence suggests that the misallocation of resources 
by firms operating in corrupt environments results in lower firm value, as measured by 
Tobin’s q.   
The second essay (co-authored with David Becher and Jacqueline Garner) 
examines the relationship between U.S. firms’ local area corruption and their acquisition 
ix 
 
decisions during the period of 1997-2009. While previous studies have shown that the 
corruption in the target’s local area affects the completion and premiums paid, we find 
that these results are significantly dependent on the corruption of the acquirer’s local area 
as well. When targets and acquirers are both from a corrupt area, completion rates are 
higher, while premiums and target returns are lower. These findings are consistent with 
our familiarity and bargaining hypothesis.  Yet, acquirer shareholders benefit overall. We 
also find that firms will employ lobbying activities to influence merger outcomes in their 
favor. Lobbying activities by targets result in fewer completed deals, while lobbying 
activities by acquirers increase the probability of completion. We also observe that 
lobbying activities by both parties are related to longer completion times, and acquirer 
lobbying results in higher premiums, suggesting that lobbying is used with hard to 
complete deals. These results are not explained by location or industry. The evidence 
suggests that acquirers which have dealt with corrupt environments previously are able to 
overcome the costs related to the target’s corrupt environment. 
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Essay 1. Corrupting Investment 
 
1.  Introduction 
How do managers respond when operating within a corrupt political 
environment? Economic theory argues that a manager’s entrepreneurial spirit does not 
change when facing such a situation; it is the environment that changes and entrepreneurs 
must respond to those changes (Baumol, 1990).  Output, according to Baumol, depends 
on the allocation between productive activities, such as investment, and socially 
unproductive activities such as rent-seeking or organized crime. This allocation is heavily 
influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to such activities.  That is, the quality of 
the political, economic, and legal institutions (i.e., “the rules of the game”), determine the 
rewards for productive or unproductive actions.   
In this paper, we explore how political corruption interferes with the resource 
allocation process at the firm level.  Corruption, defined as an abuse of public power for 
private benefit, is a global problem and has been fiercely debated in the literature. Early 
studies suggest that corruption is efficient, a means by which the “wheels can be greased” 
in order to obtain productive outcomes.  For example, corruption may allow easy 
navigation through bureaucratic red tape (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1970) via bribes, which may 
allow some to more easily navigate through bureaucracy. However, more recent literature 
suggests that corruption is more akin to “sand in the wheels,” and find that that corruption 
leads to an inefficient allocation of capital on the basis of political opportunities rather 
than economic ones.  It has been associated with weak governments (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993) and slower macro-economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Aidt, 
2009).  Moreover, it adds uncertainty and risk for companies that enter corrupt 
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environments (Galang, 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  A working paper by Brown et 
al. (2014) suggests that corruption might also lead to entrenchment at the corporate level 
and impose substantial agency costs upon the firm’s shareholders. They find that firms 
with strong governance are particularly vulnerable to corruption.  In these views, a 
corrupt political environment is evidence of poor quality institutions.  
Much of the literature about corruption is focused on industry or national level 
outcomes (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) and ignores 
the individual firm level response. Our paper extends this literature by exploring how 
corruption interferes with more traditional productive investment activities at the 
corporate level (i.e., research & development, capital expenditures). In the absence of 
corruption, firms should allocate capital to value-maximizing projects. However, when 
faced with a corrupt political environment, managers have two choices: 1) continue to 
compete as before while rival firms gain an advantage1 or 2) commit resources to capture 
transfers of wealth  via legal means such as lobbying.  These choices can be characterized 
as devoting efforts to private-sector wealth creation in real assets or toward securing 
wealth redistribution through the political and legal process.   
If the “rules of the game” include corrupt political environments, all else equal, 
firms operating in these areas face the potential of suboptimal investment since political 
corruption may subvert resources away from some firms and towards those that are 
“favored.”   Firms respond by engaging in legal, although socially unproductive, 
activities such as lobbying in order to level the playing field.  Lobbying, therefore, is one 
way to gain political influence and can be used as a proxy for political activities.  The 
                                                 
1 Rival firms may gain an advantage legally through lobbying or illegally through their own corrupt 
activities. 
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recent literature suggests several avenues for such influence. Grossman and Helpman 
(2001) argue that lobbying can add value by allowing firms to communicate specialized 
knowledge to uninformed or overburdened policy makers. Yu and Yu (2010) find that 
firms will lobby to enhance future revenues through favorable regulation and/or business 
conditions. Borisov et al. (2013) find that part of the value derived from lobbying may 
arise from unethical arrangements between policymakers and firms. In particular, 
Mironov (2014) shows that CEOs with a penchant for corruption tend to outperform their 
peers in corrupt countries. While lobbying may prove beneficial, Chen, Parsley and Yang 
(2010) show that excess returns of lobbying intensive firms diminish as time goes by, 
suggesting that lobbying has the largest effects only in the short term.   Indeed, the 
greater spending on lobbying may simply substitute for those spent on investment such as 
research and development costs (“R&D”) and capital expenditures. To answer these 
questions, we utilize reports on federal corruption convictions from the Public Integrity 
Section at the Department of Justice over the 12-year time period from 1998 to 2009. 
Using a sample of 10,707 firm-year observations from 1,870 unique companies, we find 
that firms systematically spend more resources on lobbying when they operate in a 
corrupt political environment.  Our results suggest that these firms expend these 
resources in an effort to secure more predictable cash flows. We find that lobbying firms 
exhibit lower cash flow and stock return volatility. Our results are robust to several 
econometric methods which control for the endogenous choice to lobby.  These lobbying 
firms are also perceived by investors to be less risky. Investors at lobbying firms demand 
lower required rates of return as our evidence indicates that the cost of equity and the 
weighted average cost of capital is decreasing with lobbying expenditures.  
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However, the safer cash flows which we observe come at a cost. We find that 
when firms face corrupt environments, traditional investment is subverted to gain 
political influence. We provide evidence that when firms spend on lobbying, they shift 
resources away from traditional investments which support growth, and this ultimately 
harms firm value.  That is, when firms operate in corrupt political environments, they 
spend more resources on lobbying, diverting scarce resources away from traditional 
corporate investment and R&D.   This misallocation of resources results in a loss of 
shareholder wealth.  A firm that engages in lobbying typically spends fifty-three million 
dollars less, on average, in investments than its non-lobbying counterpart. Also, when 
firms are located in the more  corrupt areas, Tobin’s Q is, on average 11.4  % lower than 
firms in less corrupt areas.  Lobbying is associated with higher firm value but is unable to 
overcome the harm associated with corrupt environments. At sample median, a firm 
which operates in a more corrupt area will lose $359.4 million in shareholder value. 
Moreover, an additional federal conviction in the area where the firm is located will 
result in a median loss of 7.1 million dollars of shareholder value.  
Our paper adds to the growing literature on corruption and political lobbying. Our 
paper is also the first, to our knowledge that provides the rationale of why firms in 
corrupt political environments lose value: dollars spent on lobbying represent a 
misallocation of precious resources which is harmful to the firm. 
We begin by reviewing the current literature on corruption and lobbying and 
develop our hypotheses in Section II.  In Section III, we describe our sample and data 
while Section IV reports our results.  We conclude in Section V.   
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2.  Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Corruption   
The literature has debated the impact of corruption on economic and financial 
outcomes.  Some argue that corruption is efficient and can lead to economic growth and 
prosperity.  Leff (1964) and Leys (1970) suggest that corruption can actually circumvent 
regulations, by introducing policies that would otherwise been unavailable.  This line of 
argument is based on the notion of “speed money” or bribes, which may allow some to 
navigate through bureaucratic red tape more quickly. Egger and Winner (2005) find that 
corruption stimulates foreign direct investment, lending support to the “greased wheel” 
hypothesis of corruption.   
However, it should be noted that corruption being efficient  is only available to 
those willing to expend the required resources to circumvent regulation (either legally 
through lobbying or illegally via bribery), and this consequently puts firms unwilling to 
make this expenditure at a relative disadvantage. Much of the recent literature suggests 
that corruption is inefficient and acts more like “sand in the wheels.”  In his seminal 
study, Mauro (1995) finds that corruption is negatively associated with investment/GDP 
and per capital GDP growth.  Others (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993) corroborate these findings.  Corruption is also associated with lower foreign 
investment (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Wei, 1999). Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show 
that even when corruption is associated with higher public spending, the spending occurs 
for low-productivity projects at the expense of value enhancing ones.  Galang (2012) 
stresses that corruption has a “corrosive” impact on global economy.  Corruption not only 
makes it difficult for developing countries to attract foreign investment, but also adds 
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uncertainty and risk to the effort of companies that enter corrupt environments (Galang, 
2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In Baumol’s view (1990), corruption is evidence of a 
poor quality institutional environment, which will encourage misallocation from 
productive to unproductive activities.  According to Baumol (1990) and Sobel (2008) 
political and legal processes which do not reward private-sector wealth creation are 
evidence of poor quality institutions.  
The aforementioned studies tend to focus on the impact of corruption on measures 
of growth and development at a macroeconomic scale.  While there are some studies on 
the impact of corruption on specific firms, they tend to be limited to certain countries 
(Africa: Bates, 1981; Pakistan: Khwaja and Mian, 2005, and Peru: DeSoto, 1989).  A 
notable exception is a recent study by Brown et al. (2014) who find that corruption 
impairs the corporate governance of the firm, leading to agency problems, lower 
investment efficiency, and lower firm value. A major difference in our work is that we 
document the channel by which firms located in corrupt environments lose value. In an 
attempt to overcome corrupt political environments, firms may subvert resources away 
from traditional investments to socially unproductive activities (e.g. lobbying), which 
results in a decrease in overall firm value.   
2.2 Lobbying 
Lobbying is the practice of seeking to influence a politician or public official 
regarding the passing or defeat of legislation or changing current laws to provide benefits 
to parties with special interests.  Baumol (1990) suggests that the reward for seeking 
political influence through activities such as lobbying should be higher in corrupt 
environments (or those with poor institutions) since firms in these environments are more 
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likely to be able to capture wealth transfers through unproductive activities.  Public firms 
regularly engage in lobbying.  During the 1997-1998 election cycle, expenditures on 
lobbying were $2.6 billion (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose, 2000), and Hill, Kelly, 
Lockhart, and Van Ness (2013) find that 19% of Compustat firms engage in lobbying.  
The benefits of lobbying include lower effective tax rates (Richter, 
Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2008) and tax savings (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz,, 
2009). Gao and Huang (2014) report evidence that hedge funds with lobbying 
connections trade more heavily in politically-sensitive stocks and subsequently 
outperform funds with such connections.  Yu and Yu (2010) find that fraudulent behavior 
is less likely to be discovered when firms lobby.   
While lobbying can be beneficial, it may result in a misallocation of resources. 
Economic theory suggests that lobbying is unproductive since it reallocates wealth 
(Baumol, 1990).  Sobel (2008) finds evidence that when economies have high quality 
institutions they experience lower returns to unproductive activities such as lobbying and 
lawsuits. Borisov et al. (2013) provide evidence that a portion of the value of lobbying 
may arise from potentially unethical practices. Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2012) 
find that political campaign donations are tantamount to a free cash flow problem.  Firms 
that engage in political donations are associated with lower excess returns and lower firm 
value.  The distortions upon corporate investment created by managers vying for political 
influence are evident in the conglomerate literature. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) 
show that mangers re-invest divisional cash flows in sub-optimal “non-poachable” 
investments in an effort to both maintain control over those investments as well as secure 
the future cash flows provided by them. Thus, in an environment where claims upon 
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future cash flows are not guaranteed, managers demonstrate a willingness to trade value-
maximizing investment for security in returns. Therefore, a firm may misallocate 
resources at the margin, according to Rajan et al. (2000), to avoid even greater 
distortions.  In this way, firms are willing to take a second-best outcome in order to avoid 
a third-best one. In a similar vein, firms residing in corrupt political environments may 
expend resources on lobbying in an effort to gain influence, but risk underinvestment.   
Stigler (1971) identifies specific outcomes from lobbying including government contracts 
or appropriations, limiting competition, enabling entry to a new market, the acquisition of 
subsidies, and the influence of tax policies.  Higher revenues from government customers 
should stabilize cash flows, reducing risk of the firm.   
2.3 Hypotheses 
The above arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
Firms spend greater resources on lobbying when they operate in a corrupt 
environment. 
  
Hypothesis 2 
Firms in corrupt environments that spend more on lobbying will spend less on 
investment. 
  
Hypothesis 3 
Firms in corrupt environments that spend more on lobbying will reduce the 
riskiness of their future cash flows. 
  
Shareholder wealth is a function of two primary inputs: the future cash flows of 
the firm, which are derivative from prior investment activities, and the risk of those cash 
flows. If firms lobby in corrupt political environments and reduce the riskiness of cash 
flows, their value may increase due to a lower risk-adjusted cost of capital.  On the other 
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hand, the allocation of resources to lobbying expenditures rather than on capital 
investment may outweigh the benefit of such security if it results in less productive real 
assets in future periods.  Such a scenario would lead to lower firm value.  Therefore, due 
to this ambiguity, we propose the following hypotheses related to firm value:  
Hypothesis 4a 
The reduction of risk associated with securing safer cash flows through lobbying 
leads to higher firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
The subversion of traditional investment in capital expenditures and R&D due to 
lobbing by firms operating in corrupt environments leads to lower firm value. 
 
 
3.  Sample and data 
3.1 Data 
To test the hypotheses presented in Section II, we assemble a sample of firms 
with data on corruption and lobbying.  Our measure for corruption is constructed using 
the number of federal convictions available from the “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations” by the Public Integrity Section (PIN) of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ). The report provides annual statistics of convictions made by federal 
prosecutors against public officials for criminal corruption across Federal Judicial 
Districts (FJD) in each of the fifty states. The focus of the crimes in the report are those 
which include, but are not limited to recusals by United States Attorneys’ Offices, 
sensitive cases, multi-district cases, referrals from federal agencies, and shared cases. The 
DOJ investigates criminal activities such as conflicts of interest, fraud, campaign-finance 
violations, and obstruction of justice with many of these activities resulting from the 
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inappropriate behavior among government officials and corporate officers. The 
individuals prosecuted may include any of federal, state and local officials as well as 
private citizens involved in public corruption offenses. On average, approximately 1,000 
convictions are made by the DOJ concerning corruption every year across the United 
States. Using convictions as a measure of corruption has significant advantages to 
previously used survey evidence or international corruption proxies since U.S convictions 
provide us with a concrete measure for corruption with no sampling errors of surveys and 
also makes state to state comparisons possible compared to international perception 
indices.  
Using the PIN reports we collect data on annual convictions by each FJD from 
1998 to 2009. Out of the total of 94 FJDs in the data, we exclude the districts in U.S 
territories, which leave us with 89 FJDs across the 50 states and one for The District of 
Columbia (“D.C.”). Following previous studies (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver, 
and Mortal, 2009) we standardize the number of convictions using district population 
from the U.S Census Bureau to create conviction rates per 100,000 people (Corruption). 
The total number of convictions and average annual conviction rates by state are shown 
in Appendix A. The most corrupt region by conviction rate is, not surprisingly, the 
District of Columbia followed by the state of Louisiana.  The least corrupt are Oregon 
and Nebraska. In terms of total volumes, the highest number of convictions originate out 
of Florida and California while the least are in Wyoming and Vermont. 
Our lobbying data is collected from the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) 
via the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995, the SOPR records all lobbying activities by lobbying firms and payments made by 
10
corporations. The data from CRP covers the time period of 1998 to 2011 with 6,000 to 
10,000 unique lobby expenditure observations per year. Appendix B shows lobbying 
dollars vary widely across industries. Also the amount of lobbying expended is quite 
small relative to a firm’s asset or sales. However, we should note that this measure does 
not reflect the legitimate or illicit corporate expenditures that managers might make to 
garner influence but are not officially classified as lobbying (ex. entertainment 
expenditures, locating a manufacturing facility in a state official’s district to bring jobs, 
etc.). 
The conviction rates and lobbying amounts are merged with firm-level data from 
the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database. First, following previous studies (Glaeser 
and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2009; Brown et al, 2014), the conviction 
rates are matched to the firms in Compustat using the Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) geographic code of the firms’ headquarters. This initial corruption 
measure for the firm is specific to the FJD in which the firm is headquartered (Corruption 
- HQ).  We also match the conviction rates to the states in which the firm operates. Since 
it is possible that the corruption level of the firm’s operations, i.e.,  where the firm is 
actually doing business, could be more critical to the firm than the corruption of the 
firm’s headquarters locale,2 we also derive a composite measure of corruption that 
reflects the geographic scope of the firm’s operations where management might strive to 
garner influence. Garcia and Norli (2012) determine all states in which a firm operates 
and also calculate a weight indicating the percentage of operations in a particular state.  
Using this operations data we obtain several corruption measures.  First, since the 
operations data is at the state level, for each state, we sum all of the convictions and 
                                                 
2 Firm headquarters are not always where the firm conducts its business.  
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normalize by state population.  We then utilize the data from Garcia and Norli (2012) and 
compute a weighted average operations corruption measure for each firm (Corruption - 
Firm Operations).3  Second, we examine all states of operation and assign to each firm 
the highest corruption level of the states in which it operates.  (Corruption - Max of 
Operations).  Our rationale for this measure is as follows:  Suppose a firm operates in 
three states, yet one of them is very corrupt.  The firm will likely concentrate its efforts to 
overcome corruption in this state.   Finally, we also compute an operations measure using 
the conviction rate for the state in which the firm has most of its operations (Corruption - 
Major Operations). Examples of calculations of these measures appear in Appendix C.   
Since the lobbying data from CRP includes all types of private firms and non-
profit organizations in addition to public firms, merging with the main data set reduces 
the observations of lobbying significantly. Post merging, 32% of the final sample has a 
reported lobby expenditure larger than zero.4  Our final sample consists of 10,707 firm-
year observations with 1,870 unique Compustat firms over a 12 year period from 1998 to 
2009. 
3.2 Sample Description 
We describe our sample in Table I.  The annual corruption measure is the ratio of 
convictions per 100,000 population.  To smooth any outliers in the annual measures we 
compute a three year average. The headquarters conviction ratio (Corruption – HQ) is  
0.37, consistent with that found in prior studies (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Diego Garcia and Oyvind Norli for providing us with this data.   
4 Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Van Ness (2013) find that 19% lobby for a larger sample of Compustat firms. 
Our sample is smaller and restricted to S&P 1500 firms due to the use of governance variables. The firms 
in our sample are larger on average and spend more on lobbying dollars which is consistent with lobbying 
activities being correlated to firm size (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Van Ness, 2013). 
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and Mortal, 2009).   The corruption ratio for the state(s) of operation (Corruption – Firm 
Operations) is 0.32.  This translates into the average state having 19 convictions per year, 
with Massachusetts, Maryland, and Missouri representing the typical state with 20, 18, 
and 18 convictions per year.5 6Thirty-two percent of the firms engage in lobbying.7 The 
median firm has assets of 1.5 billion dollars and has been in operations about 30 years.  
Approximately ten percent of our sample is included in the S&P 500, and over 50% of 
the firms are diversified.  The average firm is twenty-three percent levered, and 
contributes eight percent of assets in the form of cash flows.  The median firm 
demonstrates a Tobin’s Q of 1.45 and a weighted average cost of capital of 9.50 percent.  
Our variable definitions also appear in Table I.   
4.  Empirical results 
4.1 Corruption and lobbying  
Our preliminary test of Hypothesis 1 consists of splitting the sample at the median levels 
of the three year average headquarters corruption (Corruption - HQ (3-yr avg)) and the 
weighted average  operation corruption (Corruption - Firm Operations (3-yr avg)) 
measures and testing for differences in lobbying.  We measure lobbying two ways.  First 
we create a dummy variable, Lobbying Firm, which takes the value 1 if the firm engages 
in lobbying and 0 otherwise. Second we measure lobbying by taking the log of lobbying 
dollars.8  Our results are in Table II, Panel A.  We see that firms which are headquartered 
and those which operate in more corrupt areas are more likely to lobby and spend greater 
                                                 
5 More detail about state and FJD convictions can be found in Appendices A and B, respectively.  
6 There is variation in the operations corruption measure as the maximum state corruption, is on average, 
0.75.   
7 Details about lobbying dollars per year and industry are in Appendices C and D, respectively  
8 We add the value of 1 to lobbying dollars because some firms have zero dollars of lobbying.   
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resources on lobbying.  Given that 31.9% of the full sample firms lobby, the univariate 
results suggest that firms which are headquartered in corrupt areas are 7% more likely to 
lobby than their counterparts in non-corrupt firms; firms operating in the most corrupt 
areas are 9% more likely to lobby.   
 We conjecture that firms which are persistently faced with corruption will lobby 
to a greater degree.  Therefore we create two measures of persistence.  First, we 
determine if a firm has operated in an area which is in the top quartile of corrupt areas for 
the entire sample period.  We compare their lobbying efforts with firms which have never 
been in the top quartile of corrupt areas.  We see in Panel A of Table II that when firms 
face persistently high levels of corruption, they are 19.4% more likely to lobby and spend 
18.5% more than their counterparts which operate in less corrupt areas.   Secondly, we 
define persistence as a firm which operates in a high (above the median) corrupt area in 
each of the past three years. These firms are 9% more likely to lobby and spend 10% 
more than those who face less persistent corruption levels.   The results in Panels A of 
Table II give preliminary support of Hypothesis 1.  Of course, other factors impact 
lobbying, and so we further test  Hypothesis 1 by estimating the following equation:  
Lobbying = β0 + β1 Corruption + β2 Governance + β3  SP500 + 
β4 Cash Flow +  β5 HQ_in_STCapitol +  
β6 Leverage + β7 ROA +  β8 Multi-segment 
 
(1) 
We estimate equation (1) using a logistic model when the dependent variable is Lobbying 
Firm  (0/1), and we use a Tobit model when the dependent variable is Lobbying 
Expenditure since lobbying dollars are censored at zero. Our main variable of interest is 
Corruption, the measure of political corruption, and we utilize both of the three year 
average corruption measures (Corruption - HQ (3-yr avg) and Corruption - Firm 
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Operations (3-yr avg)).9  Following Brown et al. (2014) we control for governance of the 
firm with the use of E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009).10   Brown et al. find 
that well governed firms are vulnerable in corrupt political environments.  As mentioned 
previously, our study differs from Brown et al. (2014) because we suggest that lobbying 
is one of the channels through which a firm loses value in a corrupt environment.  
Following Hill et al. (2013), we include size of the firm as they find that larger firms are 
more likely to lobby.  Our proxy for size is inclusion in the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Index (SP500).11  Hill et al. (2013) also show firms commit more resources to lobbying if 
the firm’s headquarters resides in the state capital (HQ_in_STCapitol). Other control 
variables include a measure of the cash flow, leverage, previous period performance of 
the firm (ROA), and multi-segment firms.   We expect that firms with higher cash flows 
and those with prior good performance will be able to spend more resources on lobbying. 
We include firm leverage since previous literature indicates that highly levered firms are 
more likely to engage in lobbying activities (Kelly 1983, 1985), and we expect multi-
segment firms to lobby more since they are more likely to face a greater number of 
political and regulatory issues.  Finally, we control for year and industry fixed effects in 
all models.   
The models in Table II (Panels B and C) provide estimates of equation (1).   In 
Panel B, we report the results using the operations corruption measure, and in Panel C, 
we report results using the state headquarters corruption measure.  We find, consistent 
                                                 
9 Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we use the annual measures.  All results are available upon 
request.   
10 Brown et al. (2014) use G-index.  We utilize E-index due to its availability.  Our results are robust to the 
use of G-index.   
11 We use inclusion in the S&P 500 Index as our size variable instead of total assets because in our 
subsequent tests, we normalize our dependent variable by total assets (Equation 2).   Therefore, in our 
subsequent regressions, we cannot include traditional measures of size such as assets because of its 
mechanical relation with our dependent variable (see equation 2).   
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with the univariate results, that firms which operate (Panel B) and those which are 
headquartered  (Panel C) in corrupt political environments are more likely to lobby 
(Columns (1)-(3)) and spend greater dollars on lobbying (Columns (4)-(6)). The marginal 
effects implied by Model (2) in Panel C suggests that a one unit increase in corruption 
(one additional conviction per 100,000 population)) increases the probability of a firm 
lobbying by 15%.  These same firms will spend $2.77 for every unit increase in 
corruption.  In Panel B, we see that the results are even stronger when a firm operates in a 
very corrupt area. A one unit increase in corruption is associated with a $38 increase in 
lobbying.  Our findings are direct evidence of Baumol’s (1990) predictions, that when the 
rules of the game change, firms respond in ways to level the playing field.   While the 
magnitudes appear small, the cost-benefit of lobbying are not a dollar to dollar trade-off.   
We find evidence that poorly governed firms lobby more, consistent with Brown 
et al. (2014). Economies of scale are present with lobbying dollars since larger firms 
lobby more.  These results are consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) who suggest 
that large firms are more sensitive to political activities.  Consistent with Hill et al. (2013) 
we see that firms headquartered in the state capital are more likely to lobby and spend 
more dollars on lobbying.  We find that firms with greater cash flows are both more 
likely to lobby and spend more dollars on lobbying, consistent with the corporate 
philanthropy findings of Brown, Helland, and Kiholm-Smith (2006).  This result could 
simply derive from lower taxes that accrue to lobbying firms (Richter, Samphantharak, 
and Timmons, 2008; Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz, 2009).  On the other hand, the 
finding could derive from the agency problems associated with free cash flow (Jensen, 
1986).  We also find that more levered firms are more likely to lobby and commit greater 
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dollars to lobbying.  Finally, firms that have performed well in the past as well as multi-
segment firms are more likely to lobby in the future.  
4.2 Corruption, lobbying and investments 
Since we find evidence that firms attempt to level the playing field by lobbing in 
the face of corrupt environments, we now turn our analysis to whether firms divert 
resources away from investment when they spend large dollars on lobbying.  First, we 
again split our sample into at the median levels of operations and headquarters and test 
for differences in investment.  Investment is measured in two ways.  First, following 
Hilary and Hui (2009), we measure capital expenditures (Capital Expenditure) as the 
investment rate in tangible capital (calculated as the ratio of Compustat item 128 to item 
6 lagged by one year). Second, we measure intangible investment (R&D) as normalized 
research and development (the ratio of Compustat item 46 to item 6 lagged by one year). 
We find in Table III, Panel A that firms which are both headquartered and operate in 
corrupt areas spend less on both forms of investment.  We then also split the sample into 
lobbying and non-lobbying firms and find that when firms lobby, they also divert 
resources away from traditional investment.   The findings in Panel A of Table III suggest 
that the median firm in our sample will spend $5.8 million less on capital expenditures 
than its counterparts in non-corrupt areas.  Similarly, the median firm which lobbies will 
spend $5.4 million less on capital expenditures.   
Since the univariate tests ignore the impact of other factors we now further test 
Hypothesis 2 by estimating the following equation:  
Investment = β0 + β1 Corruption + β2 Lobbying + β3 Governance + β3  
SP500 + 
β4 Cash Flow +  β5 Leverage  
(2) 
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 When investment is measured as Capital Expenditure we estimate equation (2) with the 
use of an OLS regression, when investment is measured as R&D, we estimate equation (2) 
with a Tobit since R&D expense is censored at zero. Our main variables of interest are 
our lobbying and corruption measures.  We continue to control for firm level governance 
with the use of E-index.  Following Hilary and Hui (2009), we control for other variables 
associated with investment: a measure of size (S&P500) and liquidity (Cash flow).  Lang, 
Ofek, and Stulz (1996) finds that leverage is negatively related to capital expenditures so 
we control for book leverage. .12    
 Our estimate of equation (2) appears in Table III.  In Panel B, we measure 
corruption using the 3 year average of the weighted average all  operation locations 
(Corruption - Firm Operations (3-yr avg)).13  We test equation (2) using OLS when 
investment is measured as Capital Expenditure and a Tobit when investment is measured 
by R&D expense.  As shown in Table III, Columns (1), (2), (6) and (7), the level of 
corruption is associated with lower levels of investment, as measured by capital 
expenditures and research and development.    However, we recognize that we may have 
a potential endogeneity problem caused by self-selection.  Firms which lobby may be 
associated with lower investment, but this relation may be a function of the choice by the 
firm to lobby.  Failure to account for self-selection amounts to an omitted variable bias, 
which results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.  Therefore, to control for 
the endogenous choice of lobbying, we use multiple techniques to allow for these 
differences.  First, we utilize a propensity score matching procedure.  We also use a self-
                                                 
12 As mentioned previously, we use S&P 500 for size rather than firm assets.  Since our dependent variable 
is normalized by fixed assets, we do not want to include assets as an independent variable because of the 
potential mechanical relation.  
13 We also estimate equation (2) using the headquarters corruption measure and results are qualitatively 
similar.  Results are available upon request. 
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selection model and an instrumental variables approach.  All of these techniques are 
described below.   
First, we use a propensity score matching technique.  As discussed above, we 
estimate equation (1) using column (2) in Table II for all firms in the sample and compute 
the propensity scores for the likelihood that they will lobby. Then using a caliper width 
equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the propensity score, we identify matching firms.  
We then estimate equation (2) with OLS (investment = Capital Expenditure) and a Tobit 
(investment = R&D expense) for the sample and matching firms.   These results are 
shown in Table III, columns (3), and (8).  We again find that the level of corruption is a 
deterrent to investment.  We also find that as firms lobby, they spend less on both 
tangible and intangible investment.    
For the self-selection model, we compute the inverse mills ratio (Lambda) from 
estimating equation (1), column  (2) in Table II and use this with Lobbying Firm (1/0) in 
equation (2) following Heckman (1979).  Critical to using this approach is our use of an 
exclusion variable, which will identify our self-selection model.  The exclusion variable 
must be (1) relevant, that is correlated with the firm’s lobby decision (relevance), and (2) 
valid, not correlated with the firm’s level of investment.  That is, the only role that our 
exclusion variable will play in influencing the outcome (level of investment) is its impact 
on the firm’s lobbying decision.  We use HQ_in_StCapitol as our exclusion variable 
since it is likely to be highly correlated with lobbying but should have no direct influence 
on investment. 14  We should note that the use of a Heckman analysis in the first stage 
                                                 
14 To determine if the exclusion variable is valid, we use an empirical technique found in labor economics 
(Booker et al., 2011) and used in Ang and Nagel (2012). Specifically, when we include the exclusion 
variable HQ_in_StCapitol in our outcome equation (equation (2)) along with all other independent 
variables, it is insignificant.   
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relies on the outcome equation (in our case, equation 2) being a linear model.  We can 
estimate equation (2) using OLS when Capital Expenditure is our dependent variable, so 
the use of a Heckman analysis here is easily accomplished.  These results are shown in 
Table III, columns (4) and (9).  However, as discussed above, we prefer to estimate 
equation (2) using a Tobit when R&D is the dependent variable but are unable to 
simultaneously use a Heckman analysis in a second stage Tobit (Heckman, 1979) due to 
the non-linearity assumptions of this model.  Therefore, in order to control for the 
potential endogeneity of lobbying (0/1) when R&D is the dependent variable, we estimate 
equation (2) using OLS. These results are shown in Column (9), Panel B of Table III.  
Overall, we again find evidence that firms trade-off lobbying dollars with investment and 
the level of corruption is detrimental to a firm’s investment.   
Finally, we use an instrumental variables approach.  Specifically, estimate 
equation (1), column (5) in Table II with the use of a Tobit model and use the expected 
value for lobby dollars (Lobbying Expenditure) in equation (2).  The fitted value is the 
predicted lobbying dollars based on exogenous variation in our chosen instrument.  
Therefore this fitted value is endogeneity-free.  Similar to the self-selection model 
discussed above, this procedure relies upon finding a valid instrument that is significantly 
correlated to the potentially endogenous variable (lobbying dollars) and exogenous to 
investment. To identify the system, we again use HQ_in_StCapitol as we did in the self-
selection procedure.  These results are shown in Columns (5) and (10).   As shown in 
Table III, our results are robust to OLS, the propensity score matching technique (PS), a 
self-selection model (Heckman), and an instrumental variables approach (2sLS, 2sTobit).  
Overall, we find that firms which operate in corrupt political environments spend less on 
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both tangible and intangible investment.  In fact, using our results in Panel B, column (1), 
we see that the median firm spends $7 million less on Capital Expenditure when they 
lobby.  These findings are consistent with those of Mauro (1995) at the macro level, 
which finds that corruption is negatively associated with GDP investment. We also 
document that lobbying is associated with lower levels of tangible investment. Size, poor 
governance, and leverage are associated with lower investment as expected.15   
4.3 Corruption, lobbying and firm risk 
 We have now established that firms in more corrupt political environments spend 
greater dollars on lobbying and fewer dollars on investment. These firms appear to be 
diverting resources away from investment and towards lobbying.  However, we know 
that lobbying could be beneficial to a firm because of the ability of a firm to possibly 
avoid regulation or possibly secure a government customer (Stigler, 1971). In unreported 
tests, we see that lobbying is associated with a greater number of government customers 
and a larger percent of total revenues from government customers.   We will return to this 
point later.   
As Hill et al. (2013) point out, lobbying may benefit shareholders by increasing 
future cash flows and/or reducing the riskiness of future cash flows. We now explore 
whether this misallocation of resources impacts risk.  As before, we begin with simple 
univariate analyses.  We split our sample into at the median levels of both corruption 
measures and also into lobbying and non-lobbying firms and then test for differences in 
various risk measures.  We calculate the standard deviation of returns (Stock Return 
                                                 
15 In unreported results, we re-estimate the results in Panels B using annual measures of corruption, and our 
results hold.  In addition, for the results in Panel B, we also test the headquarter measure as well as two 
other operations measures (Corruption - Max of Operations and Corruption - Major Operations) and 
obtain similar results.   
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Volatility), the standard deviation of ROA (ROA Volatility), the cost of debt, the cost of 
equity, and the weighted average cost of capital.  We find in Table IV, Panel A that firms 
in corrupt political environments as well as those which lobby, experience lower standard 
deviation of returns and ROA.  In Table V, we find that these same firms exhibit lower 
costs of equity and WACC.  These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
In a univariate setting, we see that our risk measures are significantly lower for 
firms headquartered in areas with high corruption as well as for firms operating in areas 
with high corruption. Firms that lobby also seem to be able to significantly lower the 
riskiness of their future cash flows. On average, firms that lobby have a 17.9% lower 
standard deviation of returns, a 26.6% lower standard deviation of ROA, a 8.5% lower 
cost of equity and a 11.3% lower WACC relative to firms that do not lobby.  
We further test Hypothesis  3 by estimating the following equation:  
Risk = β0 + β1 Corruption + β2 Lobbying + β3 Governance +  
β4 Size + β5 Cash Flow +  β Leverage   
(3) 
 
We estimate equation (3) using OLS and the propensity score matching procedure to 
control for the likelihood of lobbying.16  Our main variables of interest are measures of 
corruption and lobbying.  We control for liquidity, leverage and loss, three variables 
associated with our dependent variables in the literature (Hilary and Hui, 2009).  Our 
results appear in Tables IV and V.  As before, we present our results for corruption 
measured by operations (Panel B).17 We find that our variables of interest (Corruption 
and Lobbying) are associated with lower standard deviation of returns and ROA as 
                                                 
16 We also estimate equation (3) by using the inverse mills ratio in lieu of lobbying from estimating a 
Heckman procedure as well as performing an instrumental variables (IV) analysis.  Our results are robust to 
these models.    
17 We also estimate equation (3) using the headquarters corruption measure and obtain similar results.   
22
shown in Table IV and are both associated with lower costs of equity and lower WACC 
as shown in Table V. For every unit increase in the corruption variable, the standard 
deviation of returns decreases by 0.005 (17.86 percent). Every unit increase in logged 
lobbying decreases the standard deviation in returns by 0.0004 (1.4 percent), and a one 
dollar increase in lobbying decreases the standard deviation in returns by 0.0003 (1.1 
percent). Similarly, for every unit increase in logged lobbying decreases the standard 
deviation of ROA by 0.0014 (2.1 percent), and a one dollar increase in lobbying 
decreases the standard deviation ROA by 0.0010 (1.5 percent). When we examine 
WACC, a unit increase in corruptions lead to a 0.0102 (10 percent) decrease, while a unit 
increase in logged lobbying leads to a 0.0004 (0.004 percent) decrease in WACC. These 
findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3 and give credence to the notion that firms lobby 
in this environment in an effort to provide safer cash flows to the firm.  These findings 
add to the literature on the benefits of lobbying.  In addition to lowering taxes (Richter, 
Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2008) and creating tax savings (Alexander, Mazza, and 
Scholz, , 2009). We show that lobbying can lower riskiness of cash flows in corrupt 
political environments.  However, as Baumol (1990) predicts, lobbying can reallocate 
wealth, and therefore the benefits of lobbying may come at a cost. We now turn our 
attention to these possible costs to the firm.    
4.4 Corruption, lobbying and firm value 
 Our initial tests of Hypothesis 4a and 4b include splitting our sample at the 
median levels of both corruption measures and also into lobbying and non-lobbying firms 
and then testing for differences in firm using Tobin’s Q, calculated following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997).  As shown in Table VI, Panel A, both firms which operate and are 
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headquartered in corrupt environments suffer by a loss of value.  We find no evidence in 
a univariate setting that lobbying helps to mitigate this loss. Since we find that lobbying 
firms spend less on capital expenditure (Table 3), we further examine the impact of 
capital expenditures based on a firm’s choice to lobby.  We find that when non-lobbying 
firms invest heavily in capital expenditures, their Tobin’s Q is higher than their 
counterparts which spend less.  This is consistent with the literature (Yermack, 1996), 
namely that capital expenditures are related to higher Tobin’s Q.  However, we do not see 
this for the lobbying firms, further suggesting that when firms invest in lobbying, they not 
only spend less on capital expenditures but their capital expenditures are also not value-
maximizing investments.   
We further investigate whether lobbying and corrupt environments improve or 
impede firm value, by estimating the following equation:  
Value = β0 + β1 Corruption + β2 Lobbying + β3 Corruption* Lobbying($) +  β4 
Cap Ex+ β5 Governance + β6 ROA +  
β7 Multi-segment + β8 size+ β9 Cash flow + β10 Leverage +   
 
(4) 
We use the three year average operations corruption measure, and our lobbying measures, 
all defined previously. 18 We control for capital expenditures, governance, performance, 
diversity (multi-segment), size, cash flow, and leverage of the firm.  We use OLS and a 
propensity score technique to control for the likelihood of lobbying.19  Our results appear 
in Table VI, Panel B.  Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, we find that firms operating in 
corrupt environments are associated with lower firm value.  In general, greater lobbying 
dollars are associated with higher value.  While lobbying dollars are associated with 
                                                 
18 As with our other tests, we also estimate equation (4) using the headquarters corruption measure and 
obtain similar results.  
19 We also use both a Heckman analysis and an instrumental variables approach to control for the potential 
endogenous choice of lobbying.  Our results are robust to these alternative models.   
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lower levels of investment (Table III), we remind the reader that lobbying is also 
associated with safer cash flows (Tables IV and V).  So while investment is lower, the 
safer cash flows and lower cost of capital provided by lobbying are instrumental in value 
improvement. We therefore want to know if the interaction of corruption and lobbying 
has an overall positive or negative impact on firm value.  We create the interaction term, 
Corruption* Lobbying ($), and find that the interaction of corruption and lobbying is 
insignificant, suggesting that the impact of lobbying on firm value cannot overcome the 
harm that a very corrupt environment causes.  These results are supportive of Parsley and 
Yang (2010) which show that increases in excess returns due to lobbying are short term.   
We also see in Columns (1) – (2) that capital expenditure is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q, consistent with the literature.  We noted previously that we find that lobbying 
firms are more likely to secure a government customer.  We therefore create two 
additional variables:  Government_CapEx and Non-government CapEx.  These variables 
are the dollars spent on capital expenditures by firms which acquire (do not acquire) 
government customers.  We see in Table VI, Columns (5) and (6)  that capital 
expenditures are only positively associated for non-government customer firms.  
4.5 Robustness tests   
Since we find that corruption impedes firm value, while lobbying improves it, we 
re-estimate equation (4) without lobbying dollars as an independent variable, but 
bifurcated by lobbying vs non-lobbying firms and also by high and low lobbying dollars.   
We see in Columns (1) and (2) of Table VII that capital expenditures is only positively 
related to Tobin’s Q for non-lobbying firms and is generally wealth decreasing for 
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lobbying firms.  Lobbying firms not only spend fewer dollars on investment, their 
investments are not value producing.   
We also see in Table VII, Columns (3) and (4) that capital expenditures are 
negatively associated with Tobin’s Q for firms which acquire government customers and 
positively associated for their counterparts.  These findings are particularly evident for 
lobbying firms.  These results assimilate the findings in the paper, namely that lobbying 
firms in corrupt environments spend fewer dollars on capital expenditures, perhaps in an 
effort to acquire government customers.  However the diversion of resources away from 
traditional investment toward lobbying is the most problematic for firms which acquire 
government customers.   
Overall, our tests provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4b.  Firms which 
operate in corrupt environments spend more dollars on lobbying and spend less on 
investment.  These actions ultimately are harmful to firm value.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
Using a sample of almost 9,000 firm year observations over a 12 year time period, 
we study how firms behave when faced with a corrupt environment. Utilizing federal 
conviction rates as a proxy for corruption, we are able to confirm the previous views of 
corruption as “sand in the wheel” at the firm level while providing evidence that firms 
operating in corrupt political environments spend greater dollars on lobbying. We find 
that lobbying leads to safer cash flows, lower costs of equity and lower weighted average 
costs of capital.  However, these benefits come at a cost: the higher dollars spend on 
lobbying by these constrained firms (those operating in corrupt environments) are 
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directly related to underinvestment.  The misallocation of resources results in lower firm 
value, as measured by Tobin’s q.  
We contribute to the existing body of literature by providing a comprehensive, 
firm- specific examination of corruption using data on U.S. firms.  We link a firm’s use 
of lobbying, a potentially unproductive activity, to corruption since firms need a means 
by which to gain influence in such an environment.  When the rules of the game include 
corruption, firms respond by misallocating resources away from traditional investment 
toward lobbying (Baumol, 1990).  Our study is the first, to our knowledge that examines 
the impact of firm specific behavior in corrupt environments and the subsequent impact 
on firm value.      
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 Table I. Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of firms for the period 1998-2009. Variable 
definitions are provided in the last column of the table. Corruption is measured at the location of the firm’s 
operations as well as for headquarter locations (HQ).  Appendix C details the methodology.  
Corruption and lobbying activities 
  N  Mean Std Dev Median Description 
Corruption - Firm 
Operations 
8,745 0.322 0.119 0.309 
Weighted average of conviction rates in 
all firm operating states 
Corruption - Firm 
Operations (3-yr avg) 
8,745 0.319 0.093 0.311 
3 year average of Corruption - Firm 
Operations 
Corruption - HQ 10,707 0.365 0.587 0.257 
Conviction rate (number of FJD 
convictions scaled by FJD population) for 
firm headquarters 
Corruption - HQ (3-yr 
avg) 
10,707 0.368 0.550 0.264 3 year average of Corruption - HQ 
Lobbying Firm (0,1) 10,707 0.319 0.466 0 
1=Firm engages in lobbying, 
0=Otherwise 
Lobbying Expenditure 10,707    0.383  
      
1.503  
0 
Log of one plus the dollar amount of 
lobbying (actual dollar amount shown, 
$mil) 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Firm characteristics 
  N  Mean Std Dev Median Description 
Size / Scope / Governance       
Firm Size 10,707 11,506 62,680 1,532 Log of Assets (actual value of assets 
shown, $ mil) 
Firm Age 10,707 30.310 20.206 24 Log of firm age in months (Years 
shown) 
E-index 10,707 2.447 1.362 2 Entrenchment index (Bebchuck, Cohen 
and Ferrell, 2009) 
SP500 10,707 0.321 0.467 0 Indicator of S&P500 index inclusion 
Multi-segment 8,667 0.558 0.497 1 Indicator for multi-segment operations 
HQ in ST 
Capitol 
10,707 0.095 0.293 0 1=Headquarter is located in state capital, 
0=Otherwise 
Performance / Volatility 
    
Tobin’s Q 10,707 1.886 1.449 1.453 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Tobin's Q 
ROA 10,707 0.032 0.141 0.046 Return on assests 
Cash Flow 10,707 0.082 0.089 0.082 Operating income before depreciation 
minus interest expense, income taxes, 
and common dividends divided by 
assets 
Leverage 10,707 0.243 0.189 0.234 Leverage ratio 
Stock Return 
Volatility 
10,707 0.028 0.014 0.024 Standard Deviation of Returns 
ROA Volatility 10,707 0.066 0.127 0.036 Standard Deviation of ROA 
Investment Activity 
    
Capital 
Expenditure 
10,707 396.9 1431.7 66.2 Investment rate in tangible capital ($mil) 
R&D 10,707 122.0 592.8 0 R&D to Total Assets ($mil) 
Cost of Capital      
Cost of Debt 10,707 0.089 0.132 0.066 Actual Cost of Debt 
Cost of Equity 10,707 0.117 0.038 0.111 Cost of Common Equity using the 36 
Month Adjusted Beta 
WACC 10,707 0.102 0.038 0.095 ghted Average Cost of Capital using 
Actual Cost of Debt and 36-Month Adj 
Beta 
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Panel B: Corruption in firm operating location 
  Lobbying Firm    Lobbying Expenditure 
  Logit 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Logit 
(3) 
  
Tobit 
(4) 
Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6)    
Corruption - Firm 
Ops (3-yr avg) 
0.6710 
(0.013) 
0.6783 
(0.014) 
0.5540 
(0.083)  
5.7564 
(0.009) 
5.5990 
(0.010) 
4.4092 
(0.082) 
        
E-Index  0.0990 
(0.000) 
0.0840 
(0.000) 
  0.6879 
(0.000) 
0.5879 
(0.001) 
        
S&P500  0.9967 
(0.000) 
0.9196 
(0.000) 
  7.5136 
(0.000) 
6.9576 
(0.000) 
        
Cash Flow  1.3700 
(0.000) 
0.7354 
(0.081) 
  11.4059 
(0.000) 
6.3027 
(0.051) 
        
HQ in ST Capitol  0.9457 
(0.000) 
1.3411 
(0.000) 
  7.5875 
(0.000) 
10.7319 
(0.000) 
        
Leverage  0.5037 
(0.000) 
0.5980 
(0.000) 
  3.6685 
(0.000) 
4.5549 
(0.000) 
        
ROA   1.4854 
(0.000) 
   11.5935 
(0.000) 
        
Multi-segment   0.6136 
(0.000) 
   5.0175 
(0.000) 
        
Constant -1.9844 
(0.000) 
-2.7973 
(0.000) 
-
19.6037 
(0.983) 
 2.5398 
(0.210) 
-3.0178 
(0.142) 
-6.7491 
(0.028) 
        
Observations 8745 8745 7111  8745 8745 7111    
Pseudo R-square 0.073 0.101 0.120  0.030 0.040 0.048    
Chi-Square 784.37 1086.06 1023.40  855.69 1151.87 1073.66    
Prob > F, Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
31
Panel C: Corruption in firm headquarters location 
 Lobbying Firm   Lobbying Expenditure 
  Logit 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
Logit 
(3) 
  
Tobit 
(4) 
Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6)    
Corruption - HQ  
(3-yr avg) 
0.1718 
(0.111) 
0.2083 
(0.074) 
0.1806 
(0.126)  
1.2249 
(0.034) 
1.3287 
(0.020) 
1.0680 
(0.063) 
        
E-Index  0.0912 
(0.014) 
0.0773 
(0.052) 
  0.6431 
(0.023) 
0.5213 
(0.080) 
        
S&P500  0.9214 
(0.000) 
0.8563 
(0.000) 
  6.8625 
(0.000) 
6.3574 
(0.000) 
        
Cash Flow  1.3602 
(0.001) 
0.5528 
(0.279) 
  11.1632 
(0.001) 
4.9115 
(0.209) 
        
HQ in ST Capitol  0.4671 
(0.008) 
0.5549 
(0.003) 
  3.3778 
(0.005) 
4.0715 
(0.001) 
        
Leverage  0.9738 
(0.000) 
1.3880 
(0.000) 
  7.6036 
(0.000) 
10.7112 
(0.000) 
        
ROA   1.5325 
(0.000) 
   11.7687 
(0.000) 
        
Multi-segment   0.6404 
(0.000) 
   5.2342 
(0.000) 
        
Constant -1.9795 
(0.014) 
-2.6598 
(0.002) 
-4.4098 
(0.000) 
 3.9723 
(0.168) 
-1.5817 
(0.618) 
-5.1956 
(0.003) 
        
Observations 10707 10707 8667  10707 10707 8667 
Pseudo R-square 0.070 0.094 0.117  0.028 0.037 0.047 
Chi-Square 935.12 1265.43 1242.69  1029.24 1352.62 1339.26 
Prob > F, Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Corruption in firm operating location 
  Stock Return Volatility   ROA Volatility 
  OLS 
(1) 
PSmatch,OLS 
(2)  
OLS 
(3) 
PSmatch,OLS 
(4) 
Corruption - Firm 
Op.s (3-yr avg) 
-0.0050 
(0.030) 
-0.0056 
(0.019) 
 -0.0229 
(0.288) 
-0.0073 
(0.718) 
      
Lobbying 
Expenditure 
-0.0004 
(0.000) 
-0.0003 
(0.000) 
 -0.0014 
(0.000) 
-0.0011 
(0.000) 
      
E-Index -0.0005 
(0.109) 
-0.0006 
(0.066) 
 0.0010 
(0.587) 
0.0019 
(0.264) 
      
S&P500 -0.0005 
(0.542) 
-0.0004 
(0.626) 
 0.0009 
(0.907) 
0.0012 
(0.871) 
      
Cash Flow -0.0352 
(0.000) 
-0.0317 
(0.000) 
 -0.4252 
(0.000) 
-0.2744 
(0.000) 
      
Leverage 0.0081 
(0.000) 
0.0090 
(0.000) 
 0.0386 
(0.159) 
0.0280 
(0.223) 
      
Constant 0.0326 
(0.000) 
0.0315 
(0.000) 
 0.0783 
(0.000) 
0.2838 
(0.000) 
      
Observations 8745 6786  8745 6786    
Adjusted R-squared 0.253 0.258  0.211 0.185    
F value 47.64 42.14  33.33 47.95 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Corruption in firm operating location 
  Cost of Debt 
 
Cost of Equity 
 
WACC 
  
OLS 
(1) 
PSmatch,OLS 
(2)  
OLS 
(1) 
PSmatch,OLS 
(2)  
OLS 
(1) 
PSmatch,OLS 
(2) 
Corruption - 
Firm Op.s 
(3-yr avg) 
0.3649 
(0.118) 
0.5737 
(0.168) 
 -
0.0037 
(0.478) 
-0.0059 
(0.342) 
 -
0.0102 
(0.043) 
-0.0114 
(0.035) 
         
Lobbying 
Expenditure 
-
0.0083 
(0.056) 
-0.0069 
(0.056) 
 -
0.0004 
(0.000) 
-0.0004 
(0.000) 
 -
0.0004 
(0.000) 
-0.0004 
(0.000) 
         
E-Index 0.0354 
(0.307) 
0.0237 
(0.458) 
 -
0.0009 
(0.186) 
-0.0019 
(0.001) 
 -
0.0011 
(0.068) 
-0.0019 
(0.000) 
         
S&P500 -
0.0295 
(0.462) 
-0.0207 
(0.588) 
 0.0039 
(0.104) 
0.0037 
(0.129) 
 0.0007 
(0.730) 
0.0002 
(0.933) 
         
Cash Flow -
1.1356 
(0.092) 
-2.2740 
(0.093) 
 -
0.0698 
(0.000) 
-0.0873 
(0.000) 
 -
0.0531 
(0.000) 
-0.0566 
(0.004) 
         
Leverage -
1.3750 
(0.039) 
-1.5356 
(0.051) 
 -
0.0002 
(0.966) 
-0.0007 
(0.893) 
 -
0.0602 
(0.000) 
-0.0610 
(0.000) 
         
Constant 0.3627 
(0.002) 
0.9940 
(0.041) 
 0.1291 
(0.000) 
0.1236 
(0.000) 
 0.1267 
(0.000) 
0.1381 
(0.000) 
         
Observations 8745 6786  8745 6786  8745 6786    
Adjusted R-
squared 
-0.001 -0.001  0.297 0.341  0.399 0.444   
F value 1.24 1.01  66.18 65.38  132.29 122.18 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Corruption in firm operating location 
  Tobin's Q 
 OLS OLS PSmatch,
OLS 
PSmatch, 
OLS 
OLS OLS PSmatch, 
OLS 
PSmatch, 
OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption - 
Firm Op.s (3-yr 
avg) 
-0.4969 
(0.066) 
-0.4583 
(0.091) 
-0.5184 
(0.035) 
-0.4784 
(0.051) 
-0.4896 
(0.070) 
-0.4503 
(0.097) 
-0.5119 
(0.038) 
-0.4717 
(0.055) 
         Lobbying 
Expenditure 
0.0182 
(0.000) 
0.0197 
(0.002) 
0.0136 
(0.003) 
0.0152 
(0.010) 
0.0183 
(0.000) 
0.0199 
(0.002) 
0.0138 
(0.002) 
0.0153 
(0.009) 
         Corruption*Lobb
ying($)   
-0.0030 
(0.663)  
-0.0029 
(0.662)  
-0.0030 
(0.657)  
-0.0029 
(0.661) 
         Capital 
Expenditure 
2.2006 
(0.004) 
2.2043 
(0.004) 
0.4162 
(0.497) 
0.4199 
(0.495)     
         
Gov.Cust. CapEx 
    
-1.4840 
(0.574) 
-1.4875 
(0.573) 
-3.7478 
(0.130) 
-3.7470 
(0.131) 
         Non Gov.Cust. 
CapEx     
2.2414 
(0.003) 
2.2451 
(0.003) 
0.4557 
(0.453) 
0.4596 
(0.451) 
         
E-index 
-0.0867 
(0.000) 
-0.0865 
(0.000) 
-0.0731 
(0.001) 
-0.0728 
(0.001) 
-0.0865 
(0.000) 
-0.0863 
(0.000) 
-0.0733 
(0.001) 
-0.0730 
(0.001) 
         
ROA 
1.6709 
(0.017) 
1.6710 
(0.017) 
1.9893 
(0.001) 
1.9896 
(0.001) 
1.6738 
(0.016) 
1.6740 
(0.016) 
1.9933 
(0.001) 
1.9936 
(0.001) 
         
Multi-segment 
-0.2784 
(0.001) 
-0.2779 
(0.001) 
-0.2772 
(0.000) 
-0.2767 
(0.000) 
-0.2829 
(0.000) 
-0.2824 
(0.000) 
-0.2814 
(0.000) 
-0.2809 
(0.000) 
         
Firm Size 
-0.0833 
(0.004) 
-0.0833 
(0.004) 
-0.0514 
(0.086) 
-0.0515 
(0.085) 
-0.0832 
(0.004) 
-0.0831 
(0.004) 
-0.0518 
(0.084) 
-0.0518 
(0.084) 
         
Cash Flow 
1.2944 
(0.165) 
1.2926 
(0.166) 
3.6250 
(0.000) 
3.6238 
(0.000) 
1.2991 
(0.164) 
1.2973 
(0.165) 
3.6331 
(0.000) 
3.6319 
(0.000) 
         
Leverage 
-0.7011 
(0.015) 
-0.7014 
(0.015) 
-0.6399 
(0.015) 
-0.6398 
(0.015) 
-0.6979 
(0.015) 
-0.6983 
(0.015) 
-0.6353 
(0.016) 
-0.6352 
(0.016) 
         
Constant 
4.1590 
(0.000) 
4.1425 
(0.000) 
3.3338 
(0.000) 
3.3194 
(0.000) 
3.4254 
(0.000) 
3.4104 
(0.000) 
5.3408 
(0.000) 
5.3103 
(0.000) 
         
Observations 7111 7111 6786 6786 7111 7111 6786 6786 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.226 0.226 0.268 0.267 0.226 0.226 0.268 0.268 
F value 41.68 41.06 45.64 44.93 41.73 41.10 45.14 44.44 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table VII. Corruption and firm value by lobbying activity  
This table presents the regression results of firm value on corruption by lobbying activity. The 
sample in columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) are bifurcated by Lobbying Firm(0,1) and High-low Lobby 
Expenditure, respectively. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Corruption of the location of the 
firm is measured using the location of the firm’s operations (Corruption - Firm Op.s (3-yr avg)). 
Details on the calculation of the corruption measure can be found in Appendix C.  The 
description of control variables can be found in Table 1. Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. p-values are in the parentheses. 
  Tobin's Q 
 Split by Lobbying Firm (0,1)   Split by Lobbying Expenditure (High-
low) 
 lby=1 lby=0 lby=1 lby=0   Hilby=1 Hilby=0 Hilby=1 Hilby=0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption - 
Firm Op.s (3-yr 
avg) 
-0.2098 
(0.537) 
-0.4712 
(0.040) 
-0.1695 
(0.619) 
-0.4655 
(0.042)  
-0.3370 
(0.492) 
-0.5115 
(0.013) 
-0.2973 
(0.544) 
-0.5077 
(0.014) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
-1.4518 
(0.069) 
2.8083 
(0.000) 
   -2.6422 
(0.040) 
2.4845 
(0.000) 
  
Gov.Cust. CapEx   -8.9350 
(0.036) 
-0.4185 
(0.904) 
   -12.8856 
(0.033) 
0.1752 
(0.954) 
Non Gov.Cust. 
CapEx 
  -1.3759 
(0.085) 
2.8440 
(0.000) 
   -2.4792 
(0.054) 
2.5040 
(0.000) 
E-index -0.0837 
(0.000) 
-0.0903 
(0.000) 
-0.0844 
(0.000) 
-0.0899 
(0.000) 
 -0.0501 
(0.139) 
-0.0826 
(0.000) 
-0.0523 
(0.122) 
-0.0827 
(0.000) 
ROA 1.4757 
(0.000) 
1.7109 
(0.000) 
1.4750 
(0.000) 
1.7135 
(0.000) 
 6.6527 
(0.000) 
1.5395 
(0.000) 
6.6315 
(0.000) 
1.5415 
(0.000) 
Multi-segment -0.3476 
(0.000) 
-0.2321 
(0.000) 
-0.3599 
(0.000) 
-0.2358 
(0.000) 
 -0.2677 
(0.007) 
-0.2815 
(0.000) 
-0.2778 
(0.005) 
-0.2837 
(0.000) 
Firm Size -0.0586 
(0.006) 
-0.0770 
(0.000) 
-0.0595 
(0.005) 
-0.0766 
(0.000) 
 -0.0210 
(0.541) 
-0.0678 
(0.000) 
-0.0235 
(0.494) 
-0.0679 
(0.000) 
Cash Flow 6.1254 
(0.000) 
0.5110 
(0.043) 
6.1385 
(0.000) 
0.5140 
(0.042) 
 6.2473 
(0.000) 
0.9693 
(0.000) 
6.2627 
(0.000) 
0.9727 
(0.000) 
Leverage -0.6658 
(0.001) 
-0.7271 
(0.000) 
-0.6756 
(0.001) 
-0.7247 
(0.000) 
 -0.7356 
(0.012) 
-0.6555 
(0.000) 
-0.7445 
(0.011) 
-0.6536 
(0.000) 
Constant 3.7123 
(0.000) 
3.7460 
(0.000) 
4.9455 
(0.000) 
3.2543 
(0.000) 
 2.6845 
(0.003) 
3.5503 
(0.000) 
2.7474 
(0.002) 
3.5582 
(0.000) 
          
Observations 2037 5074 2037 5074  1025 6086 1025 6086 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.376 0.192 0.377 0.192  0.494 0.202 0.495 0.202 
F value 20.77 19.52 20.52 19.53  18.86 24.74 18.62 24.37 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 Essay 2. Effects of Corruption on Mergers 
 
1. Introduction 
  Corruption, defined as an abuse of public power for private benefit, is a global 
problem and has been fiercely debated in the literature. Early studies suggest that 
corruption is efficient, a means by which the “wheels can be greased” in order to obtain 
productive outcomes.  For example, corruption may allow easy navigation through 
bureaucratic red tape (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1970) via bribes, which may allow some to more 
easily navigate through bureaucracy. However, more recent literature suggests that 
corruption is more akin to “sand in the wheels,” and find that that corruption leads to an 
inefficient allocation of capital on the basis of political opportunities rather than 
economic ones.  It has been associated with weak governments (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993) and slower macro-economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Aidt, 2009).  Moreover, it adds 
uncertainty and risk for companies that enter corrupt environments (Galang, 2011; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).   
Corruption issues present significant risks in mergers and acquisitions, 
particularly in cross-border transactions. According to Ernst & Young, companies should 
identify the exposure that mergers and acquisitions may bring which can be achieved 
through effective anti-corruption due diligence.  This type of due diligence has received a 
great deal of attention in cross-border mergers and acquisitions due to an increased focus 
on enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Canadian Corruptions 
of Foreign Public Officials Act, and the U.K. Bribery Act.   Corruption has the potential 
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 of undermining the completion and the value of the deal.  Indeed, Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) find that corruption of the host country negatively impacts foreign direct 
investment.   
U.S. domestic merger and acquisitions may also face corruption.  Recent studies 
(Aidt, 2009; Butler, Fauver and Mortal, 2009; Brown, Smith, White and Zutter, 2014; 
Garner, Kim and Yore 2014;  Liu and Mikesell, 2014) suggest that corruption can impede 
growth and investment.   Similar problems that plague international mergers may also 
pose barriers to domestic ones.   
Moreover, as Baumol (1990) points out, when firms face corrupt environments, 
they may engage in unproductive behavior such as lobbying in order to level the playing 
field.   Sobel (2008) and Garner, Kim and Yore (2014) find that firms which operate in 
corrupt political districts lobby more in order to minimize the harm caused by corruption.  
There is anecdotal evidence that firms employ lobbying to effect merger outcomes. 
AT&T’s recent $49 billion bid for DirecTV has seen a total amount of $16 million being 
spent on lobbying by AT&T in 2013 alone. This is close to double the amount of dollars 
spent on lobbying in AT&T’s previous attempt to acquire T-Mobile in 2011. Comcast’s 
recent bid to acquire Time Warner Cable has brought spotlight onto the “army” of 
lobbyists that Comcast has deployed to make the deal come to fruition. According to first 
quarter 2014 filings with the Senate Office of Public Records, Comcast has registered 
close to 80 lobbyists across 24 firms. It has been reported that Comcast spent close to $19 
million dollars in 2013 alone to facilitate the merger.20  
                                                 
20 http://time.com/79569/comcast-has-about-76-lobbyists-working-washington-on-cable-merger-this-is-
why/ 
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 While it is evident that lobbying is actively used to influence merger outcomes, it 
is unclear whether the lobbying activities will be different for targets and acquirers 
located in corrupt environments. A brief observation of a sample of merger deals during 
the 1997 to 2009 period shows some evidence that this may be the case (Appendix D). 
Acquirers located in more corrupt environments (Acq Top Q corruption=1) spend 
significantly more in lobbying dollars than their counterparts in less corrupt 
environments. We also find that the probability of a merger completion is higher for 
acquirers that engage in lobbying (Acq lby=1).21 These preliminary findings provide 
evidence consistent with previous studies (Garner, Kim, and Yore, 2014).     
In this paper, we explore whether political corruption interferes with domestic 
merger outcomes and if firm lobbying is associated with these mergers. Corruption in 
cross-border transactions often involves paying bribes to the host country’s government, 
and the above mentioned laws seek to preclude such behavior.  However, what about 
domestic corruption?  What means might acquirers and targets employ to overcome or 
exploit domestic corruption?   
Our paper adds to the growing literature on corruption and political lobbying. We 
also contribute to the existing literature of mergers and acquisitions by identifying an 
additional dimension that can affect the outcome and value creation of a merger. Our 
paper is the first, to our knowledge that examines the impact of corruption and lobbying 
on domestic (U.S.) mergers.   
                                                 
21 We test whether these results are driven by hostile deals and find that the completion rate is higher for 
acquirers that lobby, regardless of hostile or friendly deals. 
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 We find that when merger targets are located in corrupt environments deals are 
less likely to be completed, and deals take longer to be completed. However, we find that 
when the acquirer is also from a corrupt environment the probability of completion is 
higher, the time to complete the deal decreases, and premiums paid as well as target 
CARs are lower. This suggests that while corruption in the target area makes merger 
deals more difficult to complete, acquirers which have coped with corrupt environments 
are able or willing to deal with such obstacles, consistent with our familiarity and 
bargaining hypothesis. We find that firms will employ lobbying activities to influence 
merger outcomes. Lobbying activities by targets result in fewer completed deals, while 
lobbying activities by acquirers increase the probability of completion. We also observe 
that lobbying activities by both parties are related to longer completion times, and 
acquirer lobbying results in higher premiums. These results suggest that lobbying is more 
likely to be used in high profile, hard to complete deals. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Economic theory argues that a manager’s entrepreneurial spirit does not change 
when facing a corrupt environment; it is the environment that changes and entrepreneurs 
must respond to those changes (Baumol, 1990).  Output, according to Baumol, depends 
on the allocation between productive activities, such as investment, and socially 
unproductive activities such as rent-seeking or organized crime. This allocation is heavily 
influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to such activities.  That is, the quality of 
the political, economic, and legal institutions (i.e., “the rules of the game”), determine the 
rewards for productive or unproductive actions.   
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 The literature has examined the impact of corruption, primarily on cross border 
mergers and investment.  For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that corruption 
is derogatory to investment and growth and deters outsiders from investing in the corrupt 
country.  Weitzel and Burns (2006) find that host country corruption is negatively related 
to target premiums. They find that the effect is consistent for both foreign and domestic 
acquirers. Weitzel and Burns argue that the negative effect on target premiums shows that 
target area corruption imposes a significant discount on the merger synergies of the deal.  
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) argue that countries 
with stricter regulations of entry tend to be associated with higher corruption. They argue 
that the strict regulations of entry produce a “double benefit” for incumbent firms via 
increased revenues and lower competition. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) suggest that 
corruption is a serious obstacle for a company considering entrance into a new country. 
They find that corruption has a negative effect on foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
firms typically do not support the idea of entering a corrupt environment. They also find 
that the negative effect is strongest when the distance between the corruption of the host 
country and foreign firm is large. Corrupt environments often raise transaction costs since 
they are often associated with the employment of brokers, middlemen and local partners 
in order to complete deals (Lambsdorff, 2002).   Corruption can therefore raise the barrier 
to entry and exit in markets (Rose-Ackerman, 1999 and Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). 
Since the barrier to entry rises with corruption, the bargaining power of the target may 
increase, causing premiums to be higher.   
2.1 Market obstacle hypotheses 
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 While the impact of corruption has been extensively studied, other studies 
(Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008) suggest that when firms face corrupt environments, they 
may engage in unproductive behavior such as lobbying in order to level the playing field.   
A recent study by Garner, Kim, and Yore (2014) finds evidence to suggest that when 
firms operate in corrupt environments, lobbying can mitigate some of the harm caused by 
corruption.   As pointed out by Motta and Ruta (2012) in a standard lobbying model 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Grossman and Helpman 1994), politicians care about 
social welfare, but attach a positive weight on political contributions from firms. In 
equilibrium, governments’ actions (and, possibly, the decision on whether to approve or 
block a merger) can be influenced by lobbying.  Indeed, Comcast has registered 76 
lobbyists at 24 different firms to help its impending merger with Time Warner Cable.  
AT&T has spent almost $16 million in lobbying for its proposed deal with DirectTV. 
When AT&T tried to “swallow” T-Mobile, it spent a mere $7 million lobbying Congress.  
That deal did not go through.  The doubling of influence spending may suggest that if a 
firm lobbies enough, a deal will be approved.    
These arguments lead to our first set of hypotheses: 
-Completion rates are lower for targets in more corrupt areas.   
-Completion rates are higher (lower) the more the acquirer (target) lobbies 
-Premiums are higher when the target is in a corrupt area.  
2.2 Discount on takeover synergies hypothesis: 
On the other hand, Weigtzel and Burns (2006), in a study of cross-border mergers, 
find that targets in countries with high corruption are paid a significantly lower premium, 
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 indicating that the host country corruption significantly discounts the value of synergies 
achievable through the merger.   For an acquirer, corruption in a target country adds 
uncertainty to returns through risk such as losing public procurement contracts due to 
bribery of competitors, the risk that bribery by representatives of their own organization 
may be detected, or bringing about potentially unknown costs. Since corruption adds 
uncertainty of returns, corruption therefore forces acquirers to include unknown factors in 
their estimation of joint synergies.   Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2002) suggest that corruption 
can be seen as a tax on investment or as a discount to expected cash flows which lowers 
the NPV of the takeover synergies.  As such, an acquirer will value targets in corrupt 
areas at a discount relative to targets in less corrupt areas, possibly paying less.  These 
arguments lead to a second hypothesis:   
            -Premiums are lower for targets in more corrupt areas 
2.3 Familiarity and bargaining hypotheses 
While the target may be in a corrupt area and pose barriers to entry, the acquirer 
may have experience dealing with corruption.  Shimizu et al. (2004) and Harzing (2003) 
in studies of cross-border mergers suggest that the cultural differences between host and 
home country play a significant role in in deciding entry mode.  As such, the lower the 
cultural distance between host and home country will increase the likelihood of entry.   
Wu (2006) suggests that in cross border mergers, if the acquirer is from a corrupt 
country, the corruption of the host country is less of a barrier since the acquiring firm is 
aware of the rules of the game. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) also suggest that FDI is 
negatively related to the difference between the corruption of the host area (country) and 
entering (foreign) firm. When a domestic merger occurs, the level of corruption between 
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 headquarters (or operations) locations can be vastly different, similar to cross-border 
mergers.   
Coff (1999) shows that soft information arising from the geographic proximity is 
more valuable when the quality of target's assets are difficult to measure and there 
is uncertainty about the extent of synergies. Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008) 
examine the information advantage of geographic proximity between firms and find that 
if local acquirers’ information advantages facilitated discovery of potential synergies, 
local deals are associated with higher overall returns than the average deal (Bradley, 
Desai and Kim, 1988; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989) and potentially higher target 
returns.   They also find that if a local acquirer’s information advantage affects the 
distribution of benefits between the target and acquirer,   the acquirer will be able to 
obtain a higher share of the value created. In this event, deals will have similar total 
returns, but target returns will be lower than the average deals. Therefore, if the 
willingness of corrupt area acquirers to deal with corrupt target areas (relative to 
acquirers from non-corrupt areas) facilitates the discovery of potential synergies, such 
deals should be associated with higher acquirer returns than the average deal and 
potentially higher target returns. However, if the ability of corrupt area acquirers to deal 
with corrupt target areas (relative to acquirers from non-corrupt areas) affects the 
distribution of benefits between the target and acquirer, allowing them to obtain a higher 
share of the value created, they should be associated with, on average, similar acquirer 
returns and lower target returns than the average deal.  When dealing with targets in a 
corrupt area, acquirers from non-corrupt areas may pay larger premiums to gain inside 
information about local corruption.  On the other hand acquirers from corrupt areas are 
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 more likely to have dealt with corruption before and therefore do not place a premium on 
the target’s knowledge/experience regarding corruption.   
These arguments lead to our third set of hypotheses: 
-Completion rates are lower (higher) for corrupt area targets when the acquirer is 
from a non-corrupt (corrupt) area 
-Premiums are lower (higher) for corrupt area targets when the acquirer is from a 
corrupt (non-corrupt) area 
-Target CARS are lower (higher) for corrupt area targets when the acquirer is 
from a corrupt (non-corrupt) area 
-If acquirers and targets are both from corrupt areas,  acquirer CARS should be 
higher but target cars should be lower.  
 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Data 
Our primary sample of merger activity is obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database of mergers and acquisitions. We include all completed and 
withdrawn U.S. deals that were announced between 1997 and 2009. The data collected 
from SDC includes deal announcement/completion/withdrawn dates, number of days to 
completion, deal size, type of payment, attitude, shares owned prior to announcement, 
premiums paid, as well as acquirer and target size and termination fee. Target and 
acquirer financial information is gathered from Compustat and stock return information is 
from CRSP. We match targets and acquirers to Compustat/CRSP GVKEY identifiers 
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 using the reported CUSIPs from SDC. Since we require information on target cumulative 
abnormal returns, we remove deals that involve private targets.  
Our measure for corruption is constructed using the number of federal convictions 
available from the “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations” by the Public 
Integrity Section (PIN) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The report provides 
annual statistics of convictions made by federal prosecutors against public officials for 
criminal corruption across Federal Judicial Districts (FJD) in each of the fifty states. 
More details on the crimes are documented in Garner, Kim, and Yore (2014).  
Using the PIN reports we collect data on annual convictions by each FJD from 
1997 to 2009, excluding the districts in U.S territories, leaving 89 FJDs across the 50 
states and one for The District of Columbia (“D.C.”). Following previous studies 
(Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2008, Garner, Kim, and Yore, 2014) 
we standardize the number of convictions using district population from the U.S Census 
Bureau to create conviction rates per 100,000 people (Corruption).  
Our lobbying data is collected from the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) 
via the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Van Ness, 2013). 
Following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, the SOPR records all lobbying activities 
by lobbying firms and payments made by corporations. While lobbying dollars are small 
relative to a firm’s assets (Garner, Kim and Yore, 2014), expenditures on lobbying do not 
reflect the legitimate or illicit corporate expenditures that managers might make to garner 
influence but are not officially classified as lobbying (ex. entertainment expenditures, 
locating a manufacturing facility in a state official’s district to bring jobs, etc). 
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 We use Riskmetrics to collect information on poison pills (Comment and Schwert, 
1995; Heron and Lie, 2006; Malatesta and Walkling, 1988), classified boards (Bates, 
Becher, Lemmon, 2008; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian. 2002). As a proxy for the 
business environment in the location of the target, we use the Economic Freedom of 
North America index published by Dean Stansel and Fred McMahon (2013). This index 
measures the quality of institutions the states and provinces across North America based 
on the extent of  capitalism and limited government. The index is updated annually and 
states are scored on a zero to ten scale, where ten represents a state that has the best 
institutions with highest economic freedom. (Farr et al. 1998; Gwartney et al. 1999; Cole 
2003; Powell 2003; Sobel 2008).  The conviction rates and lobbying amounts are merged 
with the previously formed sample of targets and acquirers. First, following previous 
studies (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2008; Brown et al, 2013; 
Garner, Kim and Yore, 2014), the conviction rates are matched to the targets and 
acquirers using the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) geographic code of 
the firms’ headquarters, respectively. This initial corruption measure for the firm is 
specific to the FJD in which the firm is headquartered (Corruption - HQ).    
Since the lobbying data from CRP includes all types of private firms and non-
profit organizations in addition to public firms, merging with the main data set reduces 
the observations of lobbying significantly. Our final sample consists of 2,885 merger 
deals over a 13 year period from 1997 to 2009. 
3.2 Sample description 
We describe our sample in Table I.  The annual corruption measure is the ratio of 
convictions per 100,000 population.  The average target area corruption is  0.37, 
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 consistent with that found in prior studies (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Butler, Fauver and 
Mortal, 2009) while the average acquirer area corruption is 0.48 which is slightly higher 
than what has been previously been seen.  This translates into the average target area 
having 15 convictions per year, with Texas Western, Alabama Northern, and 
Pennsylvania Middle representing the typical FJD with 16, 15, and 15 convictions per 
year. The average acquirer FJDs have 19 convictions per year, with New York Eastern, 
Massachusetts and California Eastern representing the typical FJDs with 20, 19 and 19 
average convictions per year. (Garner, Kim, Yore, 2014). Twenty-four percent of 
acquirers actively engage in lobbying while six percent of targets report a lobbying 
expenditure larger than zero.22 The median target has assets of 270 million dollars, and 
the median acquirer has assets of 2.25 billion dollars. Eighty seven percent of the deals in 
our sample are completed, and the average bid premium is 31 percent. Approximately 53 
percent of deals involved stock payment as a method of transaction and five percent of 
the acquirers had a toehold on the target prior to the announcement. When the acquirer 
has a toehold, they own about 21% of the firm, consistent with the findings of Betton, 
Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009).  Sixty percent of mergers involved a deal within the same 
industry while twenty percent of deals were within the same FJD.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Corruption and completion 
According to our market obstacle hypotheses, we predict that deals that involve 
targets located in corrupt environments will be more difficult to complete. In contrast, our 
familiarity and bargaining hypotheses says that for acquirers with experience dealing in 
                                                 
22 Details about lobbying dollars per year and industry are in Appendices C and D, respectively  
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 corrupt environments, the increase in target area corruption will not affect the completion 
rate. We test our hypotheses on completion with the following equation. 
Completion = β0 + β1 Tgt Area Corruption + β2 Tgt Area Corruption*Acq Area 
Corruption + β3  Tgt Lobbying + β4 Acq Lobbying +  β5 Same FJD 
+ β6 Same Industry + β7 Economic Freedom Index +  β8 Deal 
specific controls 
 
(1) 
We estimate equation (1) using a logistic model for the dependent variable Completion 
(0,1), and an OLS model for the dependent variable Time to Completion, which measures 
the number of days it took to complete the deal. Our main variables of interest are our 
measure of political corruption and lobbying activities by firms. We measure corruption 
for both the target (Tgt Area Corruption) and acquirer (Acq Area Corruption). We also 
use the lobbying activities for both the target (Tgt Lobbying) and acquirer (Acq Lobbying) 
as well. To control for the possibility that local deals may be driving our results, we 
control for Same FJD, which is an indicator that equals 1 if target and acquirer are 
located in the same federal judicial district (Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan, 2008). 
We also control for deals that involve targets and acquirers within the same industry 
(Same Industry) since this is likely to affect our results (Eckbo, 1983; Fee and Thomas 
2004; Shahrur, 2005, Bates and Becher, 2013). The Economic Freedom Index for the 
target area is included to control for state specific regulations business environments that 
may affect the completion of the deal (Sobel, 2008). We control for Classified boards and 
Poison pills to account for the effect of governance and take-over defense mechanisms on 
the outcome of the deal (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002; Bates, Becher, 
Lemmon, 2008; Heron and Lie, 2006; Malatesta and Walkling, 1988). Firms 
characteristics in the model include the log of target firms’ assets (Tgt Size) (Moeller, 
Schlingermann and Stulz, 2004), debt ratio of the target (Tgt Leverage) (Lewellen, 1971; 
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 Kim and McConnell,1977), and the market to book ratio of the target (Tgt MtoB) 
(Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008). Deal specific characteristics include the attitude of 
the deal (Hostile), method of payment (Stock Deal) (Kaufman, 1988; Chang, 1998; 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002, Huang and Walkling, 1997), tender offer indicator 
(Tender), percent of target shares owned before announcement (Toehold) (Stulz, 1988; 
Stulz, Walkling, and Song, 1990; Burkart, 1995; Singh, 1998), and target termination fee 
(Tgt Term. Fee) (Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song, 2005; Povel and Singh, 2006; Officer, 2003; 
Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and Mulherin, 2006). We control for Fama-French 12 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in all models. The significance in all models 
are based on standard errors clustered by target firms.  
  The models in Table II provide estimates for equation (1). In Panel A, we find 
that the probability of completion for mergers is lower when targets are from more 
corrupt areas, consistent with the market obstacle hypotheses. The marginal effects imply 
that a one unit (one conviction per 100,000 population) increase in target area corruption 
decreases the probability of completion by 0.01 percentage points. This translates to a 
decrease of 0.72 percentage points for each additional corruption related conviction in a 
given FJD for the average population. However when acquirers are from high corruption 
areas (Top Q Acq Corruption), the higher the target area corruption, the  probability of 
completion is higher, which lends support to the bargaining and familiarity hypotheses. 
Since acquirers from areas with high corruption have likely dealt with such obstacles 
before, the existence of corruption in the target area aids in completion of the deal. For 
targets that lobby, the probability of completion is 0.07 percentage points lower than that 
of targets that do not lobby. Also, each additional dollar spent on lobbying by target firms 
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 leads to a decrease of 0.008 percentage points in the probability of completion. Lobbying 
activities by acquirers increase the probability of completion. An acquirer that engages in 
lobbying increases the probability of completion by 0.06 percentage points while an 
additional dollar of acquirer lobbying leads to a 0.009 percentage point increase in the 
probability of completion. We find evidence that hostile deals are less likely to be 
completed (Walkling, 1985) while tender offers are more likely to be completed, 
consistent with Bates and Becher (2013). Higher target termination fees tend to increase 
the probability of completion while a toehold in the target decreases the probability of 
completion.  
In Panel B of Table II, we show the effects of corruption and lobbying on the 
amount of time needed to get the merger completed (Time to Completion). We find 
similar results for target and acquirer area corruption. An increase in target area 
corruption increases the time to complete the deal, yet when the acquirer is also from a 
corrupt area, the deal is completed faster. We find that both target and acquirer lobbying 
are associated with longer deal completion which may indicate that more lobbying is 
employed for higher profile, harder to complete mergers, consistent with our familiarity 
and bargaining hypothesis. 
In summary, we find that merger deals that involve target firms located in corrupt 
areas are less likely to be completed and also take longer to complete. However, when the 
acquirer is also from an area with high corruption the completion rate rises and deals take 
less time to complete, indicating that the obstacle of entering a corrupt target environment 
does not affect acquirers that are familiar with corruption. Also we find that acquirers and 
targets alike lobby to tilt deals in their favor. Targets that lobby are able to block deals 
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 while acquirers lobby to increase the completion rate.  Overall, we find support for our 
market obstacle hypotheses and familiarity and bargaining hypotheses. 
4.2 Corruption and bid premium 
Since we have established that corruption and lobbying by targets and acquirers 
affect the probability of completion, we continue our analysis to see if there is an effect 
on the value creation of the deals. We first examine the effect of corruption and lobbying 
on target bid premiums. We test our predictions on target bid premiums with the 
following equation. 
Premium = β0 + β1 Tgt Area Corruption + β2 Tgt Area Corruption*Acq Area 
Corruption + β3  Tgt Lobbying + β4 Acq Lobbying +  β5 Same FJD 
+ β6 Same Industry + β7 Economic Freedom Index +  β8 Deal 
specific controls 
 
(2) 
Our main variables of interest are our measure of political corruption and lobbying 
activities by firms. We measure corruption for both the target (Tgt Area Corruption) and 
acquirer (Acq Area Corruption). We also use the lobbying activities for the target (Tgt 
Lobbying) and acquirer (Acq Lobbying). As before, we include Classified boards, poison 
pills, Hostile, Stock Deal, Tender, Toehold, and Tgt Term fee, all defined previously.  
Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for in all 
models. The significance in all models are based on standard errors clustered by target 
firms.  
  The models in Table III provide estimates for equation (2). We find that bid 
premiums  are lower when both targets and acquirers are from more corrupt areas, 
consistent with our familiarity and bargaining hypothesis and previous studies (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Wu 2006). According to the familiarity and bargaining hypothesis, 
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 when both target and acquirer are from areas with similar levels of corruption, the 
acquirer, having experience with corrupt environments, will not pay a higher premium for 
the target’s experience and knowledge of dealing with corrupt environments. When an 
acquirer is from an area with high corruption, the bid premium decreases  3.01 percentage 
points for each unit increase in target area corruption. In contrast, bid premiums are 
positively related to target area corruption when the acquirer is from an area with low 
corruption, suggesting that acquirers with little experience with corruption will have to 
pay a higher premium to gain the target’s knowledge/information about dealing with 
corrupt environments. Lobbying by acquirers has a positive impact on bid premiums, 
supporting our earlier claim that acquirers engage more actively in lobbying when deals 
are of higher profile and harder to complete, resulting in the higher bid premium. 
According to our results, deals that are associated with acquirer lobbying demand a 3.02 
percentage point higher bid premium, while one additional dollar spent on lobbying by 
the acquirer leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in bid premium. Our results do not 
appear to be simply driven by targets and acquirers being located in the same area or 
being in the same industry. Quality of local institutions and the existence poison pills 
have little effect on our results. We find evidence that tender offers and targets with 
classified boards contribute to higher bid premiums while targets which are larger and 
those with higher growth opportunities are associated with lower premiums.   
Overall, we do not find support for our discount on takeover synergies hypothesis 
or market obstacle hypotheses for bid premiums. However, we find strong support for our 
bargaining and familiarity hypotheses regarding the interaction between target area 
corruption and acquirer area corruption. The lower bid premium for deals where both 
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 parties are from corrupt environments indicates that acquirers from corrupt areas are able 
to negotiate better terms when dealing with targets in corrupt environments.  
4.3 Corruption and cumulative abnormal returns 
For further analysis on the issue of value creation, we examine the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) from the merger deals for both the target and acquirer. We use 
the following equation to test are hypotheses. 
CARs = β0 + β1 Tgt Area Corruption + β2 Tgt Area Corruption*Acq Area 
Corruption + β3  Tgt Lobbying + β4 Acq Lobbying +  β5 Same FJD 
+ β6 Same Industry + β7 Economic Freedom Index +  β8 Deal 
specific controls 
 
(3) 
We estimate equation (3) using OLS models for each dependent variable Tgt CARs, and 
Acq CARs. The results for each model appear in Tables IV and V, respectively. Again, 
our main variables of interest are our measure of political corruption (Tgt Area 
Corruption, Acq Area Corruption) and lobbying activities (Tgt Lobbying, Acq Lobbying) 
for both targets and acquirers. Other variables are defined previously.  We again control 
for Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in all models. The 
significance in all models are based on standard errors clustered by target firms. 
The models in Table IV provide estimates for equation (3) on targets. Consistent 
with our previous results on bid premiums, we find that target CARs for mergers are 
lower when both targets and acquirers are from more corrupt areas (columns (1)-(5)). 
When an acquirer is from an area with high corruption, the target CAR is lower by 0.02% 
for each unit increase in target area corruption or by 2.73% for each additional corruption 
conviction in the target area. Lobbying by acquirers has a positive impact on target 
CARs. According to our results, deals that require acquirer lobbying result in 0.07% 
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 higher target CARs while one additional dollar spent on lobbying by the acquirer leads to 
a 0.01% increase in target CARs. As in our previous tables, our results are not driven by 
targets and acquirers being in the same area or industry.  Quality of local institutions, 
existence of classified boards and poison pills have no effect on our results. We find 
evidence that tender offers and existence of target termination fees contribute to higher 
target CARs (Huang and Walkling, 1987), while stock deals, larger targets and targets 
with high growth opportunities are associated with  lower target CARs.  
The models in Table V provide estimates for equation (3) on acquirers. We find 
some evidence that corruption or lobbying impacts acquirer CARS.  For acquirers from 
areas with high corruption, corruption in the target area has a positive effect on the 
acquirer CARs (column (6)). For each unit increase in target corruption, CARs for 
acquirers from high corrupt areas increase by 0.01% or 0.48% per increase in one 
conviction. Together with our results from Table IV, this result is consistent with the 
familiarity and bargaining hypothesis: when acquirers and targets are both from high 
corrupt areas, acquirers are able to change the sharing rule, allowing them to obtain a 
higher share of the value created resulting in higher acquirer CARs but lower target 
CARs.  
5. Conclusions 
 Using a sample of almost 3,000 merger deals over a 13 year period, we examine 
the relation between U.S. firms’ local area corruption and their acquisition decisions. We 
find that target area corruption has a significant impact the outcome of merger deals. 
When targets are located in areas with high corruption, deals are less likely to be 
completed and  take longer to complete. However when the acquirer is also from an area 
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 with high corruption, the deal is more likely to be completed.   This is consistent with our 
familiarity and bargaining hypothesis where acquirers with experience in corrupt 
environments are able to take advantage of the corruption in the target area. Our results 
on bid premiums, target CARs and acquirer CARs also support this argument. When both 
the target and acquirer are from areas with high corruption the premiums paid to targets 
are lower, and the acquirers CARs are higher while target CARs are lower. We also find 
that lobbying activities by targets and acquirers have a significant impact on the outcome 
of deals. Consistent with Garner, Kim and Yore (2014) we find that acquirers spend 
significantly more on lobbying when they are located in areas with high corruption. 
Consistent with our market obstacle hypotheses, our results show that lobbying activities 
by acquirers increases the probability of a deal being competed while target lobbying 
activities decreases the probability of completion. In contrast, lobbying activities by both 
parties increase the time needed to complete merger deals, while acquirer lobbying 
increases the premium paid to targets suggesting that lobbying activities are employed for 
higher profile, harder to complete deals.  
Our paper adds to the growing literature on corruption and political lobbying. We also 
contribute to the existing literature of mergers and acquisitions by identifying an 
additional dimension that can affect the outcome and value creation of a merger. Our 
paper is the first, to our knowledge that examines the impact of corruption and lobbying 
on domestic (U.S.) mergers.    
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 Table I. Summary Statistics 
Variables Full sample 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
              
Target Characteristics       
Area Corruption 2,885 0.37 0.58 0 0.24 11.19 
Top Q Corruption 2,885 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 
Lobby(0,1) 2,885 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Lobby($) 2,885 35,638     313,815  0 0 7,940,000 
Lobby in Top 5 issue 2,885 0.05 0.21 0 1 1 
Size ($mil) 2,885 2,484       14,657  0.60      270      326,563  
Termination fee 2,885 0.69 0.46 0 1 1 
Market-to-Book 2,885       1.88           1.98    0.50      1.28         17.45  
Debt /Assets 2,885 0.56 0.31 0.03 0.55 3.90 
CAR(-1,0) 2,885 0.16 0.26 -0.57 0.10 2.83 
CAR(0,1) 2,885 0.20 0.27 -0.91 0.15 2.87 
CAR(-1,1) 2,885 0.22 0.28 -0.92 0.17 2.82 
 
      Acquirer Characteristics       
Area Corruption 2,885 0.48 0.94 0 0.26 12.74 
Top Q Corruption 2,885 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
Lobby(0,1) 2,885 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 
Lobby($) 2,885 412,235  1,603,489  0 0 27,400,000 
Lobby in Top 5 issue 2,885 0.19 0.39 0 1 1 
Size ($mil) 2,326   20,887  90,114  1    2,246    2,020,966  
Termination fee 2,885 0.19 0.40 0 0 1 
Market-to-Book 2,199 2.65 4.02 0.64 1.58 44.21 
Debt /Assets 2,277 0.57 0.26 0.04 0.56 1.36 
CAR(-1,0) 2,149 -0.02 0.07 -0.44 -0.01 0.88 
CAR(0,1) 2,149 -0.02 0.09 -0.68 -0.01 1.57 
CAR(-1,1) 2,149 -0.02 0.10 -0.76 -0.01 1.81 
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 Table I. Summary Statistics (continued) 
Variables Full sample 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Deal Characteristics       
Completed 2,885 0.87 0.34 0 1 1 
Premium (1 day) 2,885 31.30 27.46 -9.97 26.03 97.22 
Premium (1 week) 2,883 35.42 29.79 -8.47 29.94 109.23 
Premium (4 week) 2,885 40.36 34.75 -11.35 33.38 126.25 
Stock deal 2,885 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 
Hostile 2,885 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 
Tender offer 2,885 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 
Toehold 2,885 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 
Toehold (%) 152 20.50 17.90 0.30 14.05 87.40 
Same Industry 2,885 0.60 0.49 0 1 1 
Same area (FJD) 2,885 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Economic Freedom Index 2,885 6.93 0.39 5.23 6.85 8.37 
Tgt Golden Parachute 37 0.62 0.49 0 1 1 
Tgt Poison Pill 696 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 
Tgt Classified Board 696 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 
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 Table II. Completed deals and the corruption of firm location 
Panel A : Probability of completion 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 1 
     (6) 
Acq Top Q  
corrupt = 0 
      (7) 
Tgt Area Corruption -0.165 
(0.096) 
-0.157 
(0.099) 
-0.159 
(0.110) 
-0.162 
(0.079) 
-0.373 
(0.047) 
 0.290 
(0.195) 
-0.189 
(0.084) 
Tgt Area Corruption  
* Acq Top Q Corrupt 
0.281 
(0.084) 
0.259 
(0.100) 
0.272 
(0.093) 
0.271 
(0.084) 
-0.510 
(0.316) 
               
             
Tgt lobbying  -0.685 
(0.003) 
 -0.666 
(0.004) 
-0.976 
(0.004) 
 -1.259 
(0.014) 
-0.476 
(0.086) 
Acq lobbying  0.888 
(0.000) 
 0.897 
(0.000) 
0.639 
(0.031) 
 0.950 
(0.017) 
1.062 
(0.000) 
Tgt lobbying in top 5 issue   -0.949 
(0.000) 
                 
             
Acq lobbying in top 5 issue   0.984 
(0.000) 
                 
             
Same FJD    0.001 
(0.996) 
  -0.198 
(0.664) 
0.045 
(0.813) 
Same Industry    0.324 
(0.021) 
  0.292 
(0.356) 
0.414 
(0.010) 
Classified board     0.260 
(0.311) 
               
             
Poison pill     -0.148 
(0.573) 
               
             
Government Score 0.056 
(0.733) 
0.079 
(0.632) 
0.048 
(0.773) 
0.094 
(0.564) 
0.142 
(0.676) 
 0.080 
(0.814) 
0.059 
(0.769) 
Hostile -2.645 
(0.000) 
-2.664 
(0.000) 
-2.627 
(0.000) 
-2.734 
(0.000) 
-2.002 
(0.001) 
 -3.343 
(0.001) 
-2.816 
(0.000) 
Stock Deal -0.100 
(0.534) 
-0.064 
(0.694) 
-0.043 
(0.792) 
-0.110 
(0.510) 
0.100 
(0.782) 
 -0.389 
(0.277) 
0.030 
(0.876) 
Tender Offer 0.838 
(0.000) 
0.751 
(0.001) 
0.761 
(0.001) 
0.735 
(0.001) 
0.509 
(0.232) 
 1.443 
(0.004) 
0.605 
(0.015) 
Toehold -0.854 
(0.000) 
-0.861 
(0.000) 
-0.885 
(0.000) 
-0.789 
(0.000) 
-2.048 
(0.000) 
 -0.897 
(0.050) 
-0.634 
(0.018) 
Target Termination Fee 1.842 
(0.000) 
1.797 
(0.000) 
1.830 
(0.000) 
1.793 
(0.000) 
2.014 
(0.000) 
 2.014 
(0.000) 
1.827 
(0.000) 
Market-to-Book 0.161 
(0.046) 
0.115 
(0.121) 
0.121 
(0.085) 
0.115 
(0.121) 
0.444 
(0.030) 
 0.483 
(0.001) 
0.039 
(0.575) 
Size -0.073 
(0.064) 
-0.088 
(0.036) 
-0.086 
(0.039) 
-0.091 
(0.030) 
0.048 
(0.678) 
 -0.176 
(0.048) 
-0.069 
(0.160) 
Debt / assets 0.272 
(0.331) 
0.314 
(0.268) 
0.326 
(0.257) 
0.290 
(0.305) 
-0.998 
(0.223) 
 0.959 
(0.160) 
0.114 
(0.709) 
Constant 0.990 
(0.391) 
0.988 
(0.396) 
1.123 
(0.339) 
0.782 
(0.501) 
-0.788 
(0.751) 
 0.664 
(0.777) 
0.931 
(0.519) 
         
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      Yes     Yes 
Observations 2885 2885 2885 2885 696  744 2141 
Pseudo R-squared 0.210 0.224 0.226 0.226 0.326  0.308 0.230 
chi2 344.485 375.434 381.964 379.218 158.071  134.881 296.534 
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 Panel B: Time to completion 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 1 
     (6) 
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 0 
    (7) 
Tgt Area Corruption 0.104 
(0.001) 
0.101 
(0.001) 
0.106 
(0.001) 
0.110 
(0.001) 
0.098 
(0.008) 
  0.021 
(0.488) 
0.021 
(0.388) 
Tgt Area Corruption  
* Acq Top Q Corrupt 
-0.182 
(0.000) 
-0.181 
(0.000) 
-0.186 
(0.000) 
-0.201 
(0.000) 
-0.188 
(0.019) 
                 
             
Tgt lobbying   0.226 
(0.001) 
  0.224 
(0.001) 
0.168 
(0.052) 
  0.537 
(0.014) 
0.168 
(0.002) 
Acq lobbying   0.064 
(0.070) 
  0.081 
(0.023) 
0.076 
(0.198) 
  0.053 
(0.490) 
-0.048 
(0.166) 
Tgt lobbying in top 5 issue     0.230 
(0.001) 
                     
             
Acq lobbying in top 5 issue     0.065 
(0.076) 
                     
             
Same FJD       0.233 
(0.000) 
    0.236 
(0.014) 
0.089 
(0.010) 
Same Industry       0.192 
(0.000) 
    0.257 
(0.001) 
0.017 
(0.596) 
Classified board         0.033 
(0.494) 
                 
             
Poison pill         0.022 
(0.646) 
                 
             
Government Score 0.045 
(0.312) 
0.042 
(0.347) 
0.045 
(0.304) 
0.047 
(0.280) 
-0.001 
(0.992) 
  0.106 
(0.238) 
-0.007 
(0.853) 
Hostile 0.722 
(0.001) 
0.693 
(0.001) 
0.682 
(0.001) 
0.654 
(0.001) 
0.748 
(0.003) 
  0.173 
(0.487) 
0.859 
(0.001) 
Stock Deal 0.509 
(0.000) 
0.516 
(0.000) 
0.514 
(0.000) 
0.461 
(0.000) 
0.428 
(0.000) 
  0.548 
(0.000) 
0.267 
(0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.238 
(0.000) 
-0.240 
(0.000) 
-0.243 
(0.000) 
-0.245 
(0.000) 
-0.361 
(0.000) 
  -0.315 
(0.001) 
-0.357 
(0.000) 
Toehold 0.150 
(0.282) 
0.154 
(0.268) 
0.146 
(0.294) 
0.162 
(0.237) 
0.224 
(0.399) 
  -0.413 
(0.174) 
0.183 
(0.082) 
Target Termination Fee 0.284 
(0.000) 
0.282 
(0.000) 
0.283 
(0.000) 
0.275 
(0.000) 
0.132 
(0.065) 
  0.267 
(0.006) 
0.150 
(0.001) 
Market-to-Book -0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.033 
(0.178) 
  -0.050 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.025) 
Size 0.023 
(0.038) 
0.010 
(0.363) 
0.013 
(0.246) 
0.012 
(0.295) 
0.042 
(0.071) 
  -0.026 
(0.241) 
0.039 
(0.000) 
Debt / assets 0.190 
(0.000) 
0.188 
(0.000) 
0.185 
(0.000) 
0.172 
(0.001) 
-0.038 
(0.726) 
  0.351 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0.031) 
Constant 3.569 
(0.000) 
3.649 
(0.000) 
3.610 
(0.000) 
3.484 
(0.000) 
4.090 
(0.000) 
  3.216 
(0.000) 
4.030 
(0.000) 
         
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       Yes     Yes 
Observations 2497 2497 2497 2497 577   644 1853 
Pseudo R-squared 0.354 0.356 0.356 0.374 0.396  0.698 0.294 
chi2 30.308 28.863 28.691 29.767 12.591   33.088 35.073 
65
 Table III. Target premiums and the corruption of firm location 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 1 
    (6) 
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 0 
    (7) 
Tgt Area Corruption 1.823 
(0.142) 
1.843 
(0.143) 
1.899 
(0.127) 
1.884 
(0.132) 
1.024 
(0.798) 
  
  
-3.010 
(0.002) 
2.421 
(0.068) 
Tgt Area Corruption  
* Acq Top Q Corrupt 
-3.453 
(0.011) 
-3.490 
(0.010) 
-3.548 
(0.009) 
-3.569 
(0.009) 
-2.345 
(0.582) 
  
  
 
 
             
             
Tgt lobbying   
  
1.756 
(0.406) 
  
  
1.814 
(0.391) 
-1.448 
(0.540) 
  
  
3.232 
(0.505) 
1.072 
(0.636) 
Acq lobbying   
  
3.026 
(0.017) 
  
  
3.157 
(0.013) 
4.902 
(0.016) 
  
  
1.941 
(0.470) 
2.976 
(0.037) 
Tgt lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
0.690 
(0.771) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
             
             
Acq lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
3.998 
(0.003) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
             
             
Same FJD   
  
  
  
  
  
1.419 
(0.270) 
  
  
  
  
2.680 
(0.356) 
1.527 
(0.300) 
Same Industry   
  
  
  
  
  
2.249 
(0.049) 
  
  
  
  
-0.612 
(0.804) 
2.882 
(0.029) 
Classified board   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
3.353 
(0.074) 
  
  
 
 
             
             
Poison pill   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2.573 
(0.166) 
  
  
 
 
             
             
Government Score -1.116 
(0.416) 
-1.065 
(0.439) 
-1.040 
(0.450) 
-0.986 
(0.472) 
-4.277 
(0.094) 
  
  
0.733 
(0.775) 
-2.017 
(0.212) 
Stock Deal 0.352 
(0.773) 
0.564 
(0.644) 
0.607 
(0.618) 
0.064 
(0.959) 
0.628 
(0.779) 
  
  
-0.185 
(0.942) 
0.164 
(0.911) 
Tender Offer 6.343 
(0.000) 
6.078 
(0.000) 
6.011 
(0.000) 
5.968 
(0.000) 
7.112 
(0.021) 
  
  
8.976 
(0.006) 
4.604 
(0.009) 
Toehold -0.616 
(0.805) 
-0.578 
(0.815) 
-0.687 
(0.780) 
-0.175 
(0.944) 
-1.880 
(0.648) 
  
  
-2.437 
(0.590) 
-0.673 
(0.822) 
Target Termination Fee -0.532 
(0.662) 
-0.700 
(0.566) 
-0.733 
(0.548) 
-0.787 
(0.519) 
-0.486 
(0.828) 
  
  
-1.518 
(0.523) 
-0.665 
(0.644) 
Market-to-Book -1.798 
(0.000) 
-1.918 
(0.000) 
-1.906 
(0.000) 
-1.904 
(0.000) 
-3.455 
(0.001) 
  
  
-1.725 
(0.013) 
-1.847 
(0.000) 
Size -1.780 
(0.000) 
-2.047 
(0.000) 
-2.023 
(0.000) 
-2.053 
(0.000) 
-1.644 
(0.040) 
  
  
-0.549 
(0.422) 
-2.598 
(0.000) 
Debt / assets 2.565 
(0.195) 
2.557 
(0.193) 
2.490 
(0.203) 
2.459 
(0.209) 
2.986 
(0.559) 
  
  
-3.369 
(0.353) 
4.434 
(0.055) 
Constant 46.954 
(0.000) 
48.143 
(0.000) 
47.804 
(0.000) 
46.433 
(0.000) 
73.486 
(0.000) 
  
  
39.216 
(0.027) 
52.382 
(0.000) 
 
               
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      Yes     Yes 
Observations 2885 2885 2885 2885 696   744 2141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.104   0.072 0.076 
F 7.364 7.053 7.141 6.857 3.483   2.705 5.763 
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 Table IV. Target CARs and the corruption of firm location 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 1 
     (6) 
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 0 
    (7) 
Tgt Area Corruption 0.012 
(0.209) 
0.012 
(0.188) 
0.013 
(0.158) 
0.012 
(0.183) 
-0.011 
(0.464) 
  
  
-0.015 
(0.064) 
0.011 
(0.300) 
Tgt Area Corruption  
* Acq Top Q Corrupt 
-0.028 
(0.010) 
-0.029 
(0.008) 
-0.030 
(0.007) 
-0.029 
(0.009) 
-0.042 
(0.081) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Tgt lobbying   
  
0.026 
(0.275) 
  
  
0.026 
(0.267) 
-0.009 
(0.591) 
  
  
0.036 
(0.395) 
0.023 
(0.420) 
Acq lobbying   
  
0.069 
(0.000) 
  
  
0.069 
(0.000) 
0.043 
(0.004) 
  
  
0.054 
(0.053) 
0.067 
(0.000) 
Tgt lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
-0.005 
(0.865) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
             
             
Acq lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
0.086 
(0.000) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
             
             
Same FJD   
  
  
  
  
  
0.008 
(0.520) 
  
  
  
  
0.017 
(0.440) 
-0.001 
(0.943) 
Same Industry   
  
  
  
  
  
0.016 
(0.144) 
  
  
  
  
-0.005 
(0.846) 
0.012 
(0.327) 
Classified board   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.014 
(0.305) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Poison pill   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.015 
(0.280) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Government Score -0.003 
(0.832) 
-0.001 
(0.915) 
-0.001 
(0.928) 
-0.001 
(0.945) 
-0.035 
(0.055) 
  
  
0.026 
(0.320) 
-0.016 
(0.289) 
Hostile 0.010 
(0.707) 
0.010 
(0.696) 
0.013 
(0.602) 
0.008 
(0.759) 
0.034 
(0.164) 
  
  
-0.002 
(0.979) 
0.029 
(0.285) 
Stock Deal -0.050 
(0.000) 
-0.045 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.000) 
-0.045 
(0.022) 
  
  
-0.041 
(0.103) 
-0.056 
(0.000) 
Tender Offer 0.098 
(0.000) 
0.092 
(0.000) 
0.091 
(0.000) 
0.091 
(0.000) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
  
  
0.150 
(0.000) 
0.063 
(0.002) 
Toehold (%) -0.015 
(0.411) 
-0.015 
(0.420) 
-0.017 
(0.337) 
-0.012 
(0.526) 
-0.037 
(0.142) 
  
  
-0.034 
(0.313) 
-0.027 
(0.235) 
Target Termination Fee 0.051 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.000) 
0.046 
(0.000) 
0.051 
(0.001) 
  
  
0.034 
(0.094) 
0.045 
(0.001) 
Market-to-Book -0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.001) 
  
  
-0.019 
(0.002) 
-0.016 
(0.000) 
Size -0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.001) 
  
  
-0.017 
(0.008) 
-0.030 
(0.000) 
Debt / assets 0.033 
(0.183) 
0.033 
(0.178) 
0.032 
(0.187) 
0.033 
(0.186) 
0.026 
(0.470) 
  
  
-0.023 
(0.607) 
0.058 
(0.036) 
Constant 0.293 
(0.002) 
0.316 
(0.001) 
0.309 
(0.001) 
0.304 
(0.001) 
0.570 
(0.000) 
  
  
0.122 
(0.483) 
0.419 
(0.000) 
         Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       Yes     Yes 
Observations 2885 2885 2885 2885 696   744 2141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.127 0.130 0.127 0.163   0.160 0.129 
F 10.307 10.034 10.362 9.654 5.168   4.790 7.052 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 1 
      (6) 
Acq Top Q 
corrupt = 0 
     (7) 
Tgt Area Corruption -0.001 
(0.902) 
-0.001 
(0.905) 
-0.000 
(0.936) 
-0.001 
(0.868) 
0.002 
(0.830) 
  
  
0.008 
(0.028) 
-0.001 
(0.808) 
Tgt Area Corruption  
* Acq Top Q Corrupt 
0.007 
(0.238) 
0.007 
(0.249) 
0.007 
(0.272) 
0.008 
(0.230) 
0.002 
(0.842) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Tgt lobbying   
  
0.008 
(0.279) 
  
  
0.008 
(0.268) 
0.001 
(0.909) 
  
  
-0.013 
(0.376) 
0.014 
(0.097) 
Acq lobbying   
  
0.007 
(0.137) 
  
  
0.007 
(0.149) 
0.015 
(0.056) 
  
  
0.004 
(0.705) 
0.008 
(0.131) 
Tgt lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
0.016 
(0.092) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
             
             
Acq lobbying in top 5 issue   
  
  
  
0.005 
(0.261) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
             
             
Same FJD   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.004 
(0.476) 
  
  
  
  
-0.005 
(0.703) 
-0.002 
(0.646) 
Same Industry   
  
  
  
  
  
0.001 
(0.896) 
  
  
  
  
0.001 
(0.960) 
0.001 
(0.841) 
Classified board   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.011 
(0.110) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Poison pill   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.004 
(0.540) 
  
  
  
  
             
             
Government Score -0.012 
(0.042) 
-0.012 
(0.042) 
-0.011 
(0.045) 
-0.012 
(0.040) 
-0.016 
(0.118) 
  
  
-0.019 
(0.191) 
-0.009 
(0.154) 
Hostile -0.017 
(0.108) 
-0.017 
(0.108) 
-0.018 
(0.092) 
-0.018 
(0.104) 
0.014 
(0.390) 
  
  
-0.054 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.453) 
Stock Deal -0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.000) 
  
  
-0.014 
(0.459) 
-0.038 
(0.000) 
Tender Offer 0.004 
(0.476) 
0.004 
(0.523) 
0.003 
(0.527) 
0.003 
(0.540) 
0.004 
(0.654) 
  
  
0.006 
(0.618) 
0.005 
(0.450) 
Toehold (%) 0.009 
(0.414) 
0.009 
(0.428) 
0.009 
(0.423) 
0.010 
(0.407) 
-0.036 
(0.303) 
  
  
0.005 
(0.632) 
0.014 
(0.350) 
Target Termination Fee -0.007 
(0.334) 
-0.007 
(0.323) 
-0.007 
(0.324) 
-0.007 
(0.318) 
0.013 
(0.278) 
  
  
-0.024 
(0.239) 
-0.000 
(0.995) 
Market-to-Book 0.000 
(0.985) 
-0.000 
(0.855) 
-0.000 
(0.930) 
-0.000 
(0.847) 
-0.005 
(0.266) 
  
  
-0.005 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.710) 
Size -0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
  
  
-0.003 
(0.326) 
-0.006 
(0.000) 
Debt / assets 
` 
0.007 
(0.397) 
0.007 
(0.411) 
0.006 
(0.425) 
0.007 
(0.409) 
0.011 
(0.529) 
  
  
-0.003 
(0.884) 
0.010 
(0.254) 
Constant 0.102 
(0.017) 
0.106 
(0.013) 
0.105 
(0.014) 
0.108 
(0.012) 
0.157 
(0.029) 
  
  
0.192 
(0.091) 
0.079 
(0.071) 
         Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       Yes     Yes 
Observations 2149 2149 2149 2149 549   495 1654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.099   0.011 0.070 
F 5.950 5.670 5.730 5.367 4.671   2.217 4.486 
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 Appendix A. Conviction Rate (# of convictions per population) by State 
State 
# of 
FJDs 
# of 
years 
Total  
Convictions 
Avg 
Convictions  
per year 
Avg annual  Conviction 
per 100,000 pop. 
% of All 
Convictions 
District of Columbia 1 12 474 39.50 6.83 4.04 
Louisiana 3 12 415 34.58 0.78 3.54 
Alaska 1 12 60 5.00 0.77 0.51 
North Dakota 1 12 57 4.75 0.75 0.49 
Mississippi 2 12 244 20.33 0.71 2.08 
Montana 1 12 74 6.17 0.67 0.63 
South Dakota 1 12 60 5.00 0.64 0.51 
Kentucky 2 12 311 25.92 0.62 2.65 
Alabama 3 12 300 25.00 0.55 2.56 
Delaware 1 12 52 4.33 0.53 0.44 
New Jersey 1 12 511 42.58 0.50 4.36 
Virginia 2 12 439 36.58 0.49 3.74 
Florida 3 12 959 79.92 0.47 8.18 
Ohio 2 12 640 53.33 0.47 5.46 
Pennsylvania 3 12 632 52.67 0.43 5.39 
Illinois 3 12 616 51.33 0.41 5.25 
West Virginia 2 12 84 7.00 0.39 0.72 
Tennessee 3 12 277 23.08 0.39 2.36 
Hawaii 1 12 54 4.50 0.36 0.46 
Oklahoma 3 12 151 12.58 0.35 1.29 
New York 4 12 790 65.83 0.34 6.74 
Maryland 1 12 219 18.25 0.33 1.87 
Missouri 2 12 213 17.75 0.31 1.82 
Massachusetts 1 12 235 19.58 0.30 2.00 
Texas 4 12 776 64.67 0.29 6.62 
Connecticut 1 12 118 9.83 0.28 1.01 
Wyoming 1 12 17 1.42 0.28 0.15 
Arkansas 2 12 88 7.33 0.27 0.75 
Idaho 1 12 40 3.33 0.25 0.34 
Arizona 1 12 179 14.92 0.25 1.53 
Vermont 1 12 18 1.50 0.24 0.15 
Maine 1 12 38 3.17 0.24 0.32 
Rhode Island 1 12 29 2.42 0.23 0.25 
Michigan 2 12 266 22.17 0.22 2.27 
Wisconsin 2 12 137 11.42 0.21 1.17 
California 4 12 872 72.67 0.21 7.44 
Indiana 2 12 155 12.92 0.21 1.32 
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 Appendix A. Conviction Rate (# of convictions per population) by State (continued) 
State State State State State State State 
Nevada 1 12 53 4.42 0.21 0.45 
North Carolina 3 12 205 17.08 0.20 1.75 
Georgia 3 12 212 17.67 0.20 1.81 
New Mexico 1 12 45 3.75 0.20 0.38 
South Carolina 1 12 88 7.33 0.18 0.75 
Colorado 1 12 95 7.92 0.17 0.81 
Utah 1 12 46 3.83 0.16 0.39 
Washington 2 12 114 9.50 0.16 0.97 
Kansas 1 12 47 3.92 0.14 0.40 
Minnesota 1 12 86 7.17 0.14 0.73 
Iowa 2 12 48 4.00 0.14 0.41 
New Hampshire 1 12 19 1.58 0.12 0.16 
Nebraska 1 12 22 1.83 0.10 0.19 
Oregon 1 12 44 3.67 0.10 0.38 
Guam & NMI, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands were excluded 
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 Appendix B. Lobbying by Industry 
Top 10 lobbying industries 
Industry 
Avg industry 
total lobbying  
Avg firm 
lobbying  
%Lobby* 
(%) 
Ind. Lobby 
Ratio**(%) 
Avg. industry 
lobby/sale (%) 
Avg. 
lobby/sale 
(%) 
Utilities $56,226,732 $1,175,325 53.15 10.28 0.013 0.018 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
$48,897,967 $1,929,581 38.52 8.86 0.018 0.105 
Insurance $40,559,845 $1,296,177 38.71 7.30 0.006 0.016 
Communication $38,908,110 $2,678,514 33.84 6.67 0.009 0.027 
Electronic 
Equipment 
$37,054,900 $1,643,859 20.34 6.82 0.014 0.031 
Banking $36,131,593 $1,467,851 21.59 6.90 0.005 0.012 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
$35,336,521 $1,524,992 34.47 5.86 0.004 0.015 
Transportation $32,704,309 $1,859,520 35.88 5.90 0.013 0.020 
Computer 
Software  
$25,057,663 $849,981 24.43 4.52 0.009 0.090 
Aircraft $24,503,064 $3,401,419 71.91 4.62 0.016 0.024 
Lowest 10 lobbying industries 
Industry 
Avg industry 
total lobbying  
Avg firm 
lobbying  
%Lobby* 
(%) 
Ind. Lobby 
Ratio**(%) 
Avg. industry 
lobby/sale (%) 
Avg. 
lobby/sale 
(%) 
Precious Metals $1,099,833 $317,188 67.49 0.21 0.015 0.070 
Electrical 
Equipment 
$1,047,714 $199,453 22.19 0.18 0.002 0.027 
Non-Metallic and 
Industrial Metal 
Mining 
$951,858 $330,793 38.34 0.17 0.008 0.011 
Personal Services $934,455 $229,757 18.14 0.21 0.003 0.013 
Apparel $448,167 $126,772 11.76 0.07 0.001 0.004 
Candy & Soda $409,917 $537,375 21.11 0.05 0.001 0.003 
Real Estate $314,000 $216,250 40.00 0.04 0.003 0.007 
Textiles $303,167 $182,747 21.39 0.07 0.002 0.008 
Recreation $296,875 $151,319 20.38 0.04 0.002 0.006 
Rubber and 
Plastic Products 
$50,000 $153,333 4.05 0.01 <0.001 0.012 
*% Lobby is the percentage of firms that lobby in the industry 
** Ind. lobby ratio is the total amount of lobbying in the industry over the total amount of lobbying of the 
entire sample 
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 Appendix C. Conviction rate calculation 
In order to calculate the conviction rate measures, we utilize data from several different 
sources; number of federal corruption convictions from the “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations” by the Public Integrity Section (PIN) of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ), federal judicial district and state population from the U.S. Census report, 
firm headquarters locations from Compustat and firm operating locations from Garcia 
and Norli (2012).  
Once merged, each firm year observation contains information about the number of 
corruption related convictions, population in each headquarter and operating location. An 
example of the calculation of each corruption measure is shown below using a set of 
actual observations from our sample. 
Example Firm: Kraft Foods Inc. 
Data of Kraft Foods Inc. is available in our sample for years 2001 through 2009.  Kraft 
Foods was headquartered in the Northern federal judicial district of the state of Illinois 
during the entire period. Information on the operating locations for Kraft is available up 
to 2007. While the operating locations may vary over time, in 2007 Kraft had operations 
in six different states; California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and 
Washington. Details on the weight of operations in each state are provided in the table 
below. 
Table E1. Weight of operations in each state, 2007 
State Weight  State Weight  State Weight 
California 0.3929 
 
Illinois 0.0714 
 
New Jersey 0.0714 
New York 0.3214 
 
Virginia 0.0714 
 
Washington 0.0714 
      
80
 The population and the number of corruption related crime convictions for the 
headquarters location and the states of operations are provided in Table E2.  
Table E2. Population and number of convictions, 2007 
FJD / State Population 
Number of 
Convictions 
Headquarter 
  Illinois Northern 8,259,733 28 
   States with operations 
         California 36,226,122 76 
       Illinois 12,779,417 42 
       New Jersey 8,636,043 62 
       New York 19,422,777 44 
       Virginia 7,719,749 36 
      Washington 6,464,979 9 
    
Corruption in firm headquarters location  
The conviction rate Corruption - HQ measures the amount of corruption in the area 
where the firm is headquartered in. Following previous literature (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; 
Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2009), the conviction rate per 100,000 population is 
calculated by the following equation (E1). 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐻𝑄 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐹𝐽𝐷
𝐹𝐽𝐷 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
× 100,000                         (E1) 
Since Kraft is headquartered in the Northern federal judicial district of Illinois, the 
Corruption - HQ measure for Kraft in 2007 can be calculated using the data in Table E2 
and equation (E1). 
Corruption − HQ2007 =
28
8,259,733
× 100,000 = 0.3390 
Corruption - HQ (3-yr avg) is a three average measure of the Corruption - HQ measure. 
It can be calculated by averaging the current and previous two year measures of 
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 Corruption - HQ (In this example, the three year average includes Corruption - HQ 
measures from 2005, 2006, 2007).  
Corruption in firm operating location 
Since there is no previous literature to follow in terms of the calculation of corruption in 
firm operating locations, we employ several different specifications to ensure the validity 
of the measures. Note that due to the specific address of the operating location being 
unknown within the current data, we will be using the state level number of convictions 
to calculate the operating location conviction rates. 
Corruption - Firm Operations is calculated by taking the weighted average of the 
conviction rates in each of the areas where the firm is operating in.  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
= ∑ 𝑤𝑖 [
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
× 100,000]
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
         (𝐸2) 
Using equation (E2) and the data in Table E1 and E2, we can calculate Corruption - Firm 
Operations for Kraft in 2007 by taking the weighted average of the conviction rates in 
California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Washington. 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠2007
= 0.3929 [
76
36,226,122
× 100,000] + 0.0714 [
42
12,779,417
× 100,000]
+ 0.0714 [
62
8,636,043
× 100,000] + 0.3214 [
44
19,422,777
× 100,000]
+ 0.0714 [
36
7,719,749
× 100,000] + 0.0714 [
9
6,464,979
× 100,000]
= 0.2732 
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 Corruption - Firm Operations (3-yr avg) is a three average measure of the Corruption - Firm 
Operations measure. It can be calculated by averaging the current and previous two year 
measures of Corruption - Firm Operations (In this example, the three year average includes 
Corruption - Firm Operations measures from 2005, 2006, 2007). 
Corruption - Max of Operations measures the highest level corruption out of all of the 
corruption measures in each of the states that the firm operates in. To obtain Corruption - 
Max of Operations for Kraft in 2007, we first calculate the individual conviction rates for 
each of the six states that Kraft operates in, then select the highest conviction rate as our 
measure for Corruption - Max of Operations2007. 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑂𝑃𝑠
= max
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
[
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
× 100,000]             (𝐸3) 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑂𝑃𝑠2007
= max
[
 
 
 
 (
76
36,226,122
× 100,000) , (
42
12,779,417
× 100,000) , (
62
8,636,043
× 100,000) ,
(
44
19,422,777
× 100,000) , (
36
7,719,749
× 100,000) , (
9
6,464,979
× 100,000)
]
 
 
 
 
= 0.7179 
 
Corruption - Max of Operations (3-yr avg) is a three average measure of the Corruption - 
Max of Operations measure. It can be calculated by averaging the current and previous 
two year measures of Corruption - Max of Operations (In this example, the three year 
average includes Corruption - Max of Operations measures from 2005, 2006, 2007). 
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 Corruption - Major Operations is a measure that uses the conviction rate for the state in 
which the firm has the most of its operations. Hence to obtain the measure for Kraft, we 
select the state with the highest weight of operations in 2007 and calculate the individual 
conviction rate for that state. Since California is the state with the most operations 
(39.29%) of Kraft in 2007, the Corruption - Major Operations measure for Kraft in 2007 
will be equivalent to the conviction rate in California, which is 0.2098 (76/36,226,122 x 
100,000) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑠 =  
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
× 100,000,
where 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  is state with max𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
(𝑤𝑖)                                (𝐸4) 
Corruption - Major Operations (3-yr avg) is a three average measure of the Corruption - 
Major Operations measure. It can be calculated by averaging the current and previous 
two year measures of Corruption - Major Operations (In this example, the three year 
average includes Corruption - Major Operations measures from 2005, 2006, 2007).  
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 Appendix D. 
a. Merger deals by year 
    
Number of Deals 
  Deal with target in corrupt areas   
Deals with both target & acquirer 
in high corrupt area  
Year 
 
Number of Deals (%) 
 
Number of Deals (%) 
               
1997 349  95 27.22%  45 12.89% 
1998 346  94 27.17%  41 11.85% 
1999 396  102 25.76%  53 13.38% 
2000 292  71 24.32%  33 11.30% 
2001 235  45 19.15%  15 6.38% 
2002 131  15 11.45%  4 3.05% 
2003 161  48 29.81%  22 13.66% 
2004 167  20 11.98%  8 4.79% 
2005 161  30 18.63%  11 6.83% 
2006 159  19 11.95%  3 1.89% 
2007 179  22 12.29%  10 5.59% 
2008 128  21 16.41%  5 3.91% 
2009 181  38 20.99%  21 11.60% 
        Total 2,885  620 21.49%  271 9.39% 
 
b. Target lobbying by target area corruption 
    
Full Sample 
Tgt Top Q 
corruption=1 
Tgt Top Q 
corruption=0 Difference p-value 
 
N 2,885 620 2,265 
  Tgt Lobbying Firm(0,1) Mean 0.0603 0.0645 0.0591 0.0054 0.3140 
Tgt lobby ($) Mean 35637.74 48873.89 32014.61 16859.28 0.1605 
              
c. Acquirer lobbying by Acquirer area corruption  
  
Full Sample 
Acq Top Q 
corruption=1 
Acq Top Q 
corruption=0 Difference p-value 
 
N 2,885 744 2,141 
  Acq Lobbying Firm(0,1) Mean 0.2378 0.2433 0.2359 0.0074 0.3422 
Acq lobby ($) Mean 412234.6 530102.2 371275.4 158826.8 0.0214 
 
d. Deal size, completion by target lobbying 
    Full Sample Tgt lby=1 Tgt lby=0 Difference p-value 
 
N 2,885 174 2,711 
  Deal size ($mil) Mean 1,720 8,150 1,300 6,850 0.0000 
Completed Mean 0.8655 0.7471 0.8731 -0.1260 0.0001 
              
e. Deal size, completion by acquirer lobbying 
  
Full Sample Acq lby=1 Acq lby=0 Difference p-value 
 
N 2,885 686 2,199 
  Deal size ($mil) Mean 1,720 4,050 987 3,060 0.0000 
Completed Mean 0.8655 0.9169 0.8495 0.0674 0.0000 
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